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Preface
This thesis analyzes original texts produced by ideologues and leaders of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Qaeda and Islamic State to deduce their vision for the Islamist
State. The thesis reveals the positions of the three movements from the institutions of
Caliphate, Sharia, and Democracy, in addition to their tolerance of using violence as a
strategy to install the Islamist State. The thesis concludes that the three movements
are willing to install the Islamist Caliphate and apply Sharia law. Yet, they disagree
on the strategy that has to be applied to achieve this end. The thesis explains the
reasons behind the disagreement between the three movements either through their
conditions of foundation, which affected the primary objective that the movement was
founded for, or through the deficiencies in the knowledge base on Islamic political
regime.
The thesis starts with a literature review that sheds the light on the Muslim and
Islamist visions for the state in Islam. The review also briefly tackles the Islamist
movements. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 introduce the Muslim Brotherhood, Qaeda and
Islamic State texts. Each chapter starts with introducing a general overview of the
movement’s history and ends in a conclusion and summary of the movement’s vision
through the studied institutions of the Islamist State. Each text analyzed is associated
with a brief introduction on the author (if known) and the context in which the text is
released.
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The Islamist State:
Various Visions?
In the year 622 AD, the first Islamic city state was announced in Yathrib, Arab
Peninsula. The city was the first to be ruled by an Islamist political system. Since
then, figuring out the characteristics of the Islamist State and its institutions has been
a subject of interest for Ulama - Muslim scholars - who focused on Sharia - Islamic
law - and how it organizes the relations between the ruler and his subjects. Politicians
used the slogans of Islam to create legitimacy and motivate citizens to support their
causes; this later became the case for political scientists.
Muqtedar Khan classified the theories developed by classical thinkers on
Islamist Statecraft into two categories: ‘Islamic theories of the state’ and ‘theories of
the Islamic State’ (Dar, 2016). Islamic theories of the state were developed by
classical thinkers who lived and wrote when Islamic Civilization was dominant and
before much of the Islamic world was colonized (pre-colonial theories). They focused
on the nature of the state in the limited political theory developed by Muslims prior to
the colonial era. On the other hand, theories of the Islamic State were written in the
post-colonial era when the pain of subjugation was strongly felt and the power and
influence of the former imperial powers was still palpable. They are a contemporary
attempt at imagining the utopian ideal of the just and dominant Islamic State (Khan,
2004). Alfarabi is an excellent example of theorists of the Islamic theories of state,
particularly in his landmark “Araa Ahl Almadina Alfadela (Opinions of the citizens of
the excellent city)” where he introduced a typology of politics (Khan, 2004) Qutb is a
very famous example of theorists of the Islamic State as his famous book
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“Milestones” represents a “contemporary attempt at imaging the utopian ideal of the
just and dominant Islamic State” (Khan, 2004).
Today, numerous Islamist movements all over the world are working on the
ground to attain building their perceived model of the Islamist State. An important
question to be asked is: do the major contemporary Islamist movements like the
Brotherhood, Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda agree on one model for the basic
institutions of the Islamist State such as the Caliphate, Sharia, or Democratic
Institutions and the predisposition to use violence to apply Sharia? Our initial
hypothesis is that reviving Caliphate is among the objectives of the three major
contemporary Islamist movements. Yet, they disagree on the strategy to achieve this
Caliphate and most of its institutions. This hypothesis raises secondary questions: Do
Islamist movements agree on the urgency of announcing the Islamist State or believe
in developing prerequisites to establish it? What are the differences between Islamist
movements in their vision for the Islamist State? Why do the three studied Islamist
movements disagree on the strategy to install the Islamist State?
The major Islamist movements generally agree that a basic condition for the
Islamist State is that its source of legislation must be Sharia. They don’t tolerate any
conflict with it, since they perceive it as God’s will that they have to obey.
Nevertheless, the movements disagree on the priority of announcing the Islamist State
and their tolerance for its gradual establishment, the method of electing the ruler and
his source of legitimacy, and their predisposition to use violence to apply Sharia. The
disagreement among movements on their vision for the Islamist State is caused by the
diversity of the movements’ founding conditions that were reflected in their strategies
to achieve their objectives.
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This thesis studies three major contemporary Islamist Sunni movements who
share the Sunni creed and the objective of installing an Islamist State. It deduces the
movements’ positions from the institutions of: Caliphate, Sharia, Democracy and the
usage of power. The three movements were chosen as they showed contradictory
behavior in their quest for power. Their strategies varied between participating in the
democratic competition to enforcing their power by violence and refraining from
direct inclusion in installing an Islamist State. The studied Islamist movements are
The Muslims Brotherhood, which exerted efforts to assume power through
democratic means and maintaining relations with most of the international actors,
Qaeda, which refrained from direct involvement in politics and preferred instead to
engage in a long term war with the far enemy to deter it from interfering in Muslim
territories and pave the way for Islamists to install the state, and IS, which refused
democracy and the post-Westphalian model of state and preferred to install the
Islamic State with power to rule tremendous lands across Iraq and Syria.
Accordingly, from a comparative theoretical perspective, three case studies
(Islamist movements who are the units of analysis) which share a common goal of
establishing an Islamist State yet disagree on many institutions of this Islamist State
(variables) are studied. In Lijphart’s (1971) words, “the comparative method here is
regarded as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables”. This
thesis analyzes texts from the literature of each of the three major movements to
reveal the movements’ visions for the Islamist State. It then compares the three
models to investigate whether the three movements agree on a utopian ideal of the just
and dominant Islamic State.
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1. Literature Review
This thesis intersects with two topics in political science literature that we need to
explore: the first set of literature is concerned with the Islamist State and its
institutions, which is discussed in the literature depending on studying the institutions
of the late Islamist States or depending on analyzing the contributions of the most
influential Ulama. The second concerns Islamist movements and their ideological
framework, and focuses on the three Islamist movements that we are studying in this
thesis.
1.1.The Islamist State:
The literature mainly discusses the term “Islamic State” in two contexts: through
studying either the Islamic State that used to exist or the visions of the utopian
Islamist State as derived from the Sharia and ijtihad (independent reasoning). The
most significant Islamic States studied are Yathrib city state, and the Islamic
caliphate, whereas the visions of the Islamists utopian state vary between the
totalitarian and democratic regimes and the refusal of the concept of Islamic State
altogether.
After his arrival to the city, Mohamed installed the first state in the history of
Yathrib. The state was built on the concept of being ruled and administrated in the
name of Allah who communicates his orders through his prophet (Wellhausen, 2000).
The nature of the regulations and order which was enforced by Mohamed was not
alien to the Arabic peninsula. He applied the same rules in the name of Allah with few
amendments (Serjeant, 1978). After building the alliance between Yathrib’s local
tribes, the Muhajroon – migrators – who migrated to Yathrib, and the non-Muslim
tribes who agreed to finance the collective security system and not to betray the state,
Mohamed decided to extend an “intertribal security system, a Pax Islamica, around
8

the growing polity in Medina. Pax Islamica had a religious kernel: it was a system
based on “the security of God and his messenger” (Arjomand, 2009). Only after the
victory in Mecca in 630 AD did Mohamed make the destruction of idols his foremost
objective (Arjomand, 2009). Although the state was a theocracy ruled directly by
Allah who ruled it through his messenger, Mohamed used to consult those who have
experience in the various fields (Shoura) (Wellhausen, 2000). Generally, the first
Islamic State grew as a confederate that respected the local norms and organizations
inside the tribes as long as they became a part of the Pax Islamica.
The Islamic caliphate system governed most of the Muslims since the death of
prophet Mohamed in 632 till the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1923. The
election of the caliph prior the Ummayed era was performed by various methods,
including a nomination by his predecessor, and an election based on a definite
electoral college: being forced by power. Yet the hereditary rule prevailed starting
from the Ummayed era (Liebl, 2009). Accordingly, there were no fixed schemes in
the election of the caliph except that whenever the choice was made, a Bay'ah pledge of allegiance - was introduced by the public. “The fuqaha unanimously agreed
that the caliph is not legally valid without bay’ah by the People” (Faruqi, 2009).
Al Mawardi, who lived in the 10th century, introduced criteria for the caliph,
although he did not introduce a theory of the state in any sense. Al Mawardi shed light
on seven conditions for the caliph which guided the Sunni scholars after him in his
landmark “al Ahkam al Sultanyah:”
1. Justice together with all its conditions; 2. Knowledge which equips them for
Ijtihad in unforeseen matters and for arriving at relevant judgments; 3. Good health
in their faculties of hearing, sight and speech such that they may arrive at a sound
assessment of whatever they perceive; 4. Sound in limb, free of any deficiency which
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might prevent them from normal movement; 5. A judgment capable of organizing
the people and managing the offices of administration; 6. Courage and bravery
enabling them to defend the territory of Islam and to mount Jihad against the enemy;
7. Of the family of the Quraysh (Al Mawardi, nd).

Al Mawardi insisted that the caliph must be a member of the tribe of Quraysh.
He also gave due attention to the Electoral College and the conditions of its members
and the ways through which they would deal with the difficulties in choosing the
Imam. Al Mawardi rejected the concept of the presence of two Imams and preferred
to pledge the allegiance to the first Imam of the two (Al Mawardi, nd).
Abi Yaali, who lived in the 10th century as well and died eight years after Al
Mawardi, issued a book under the same name “al Ahkam al Sultanyah”. Abi Yaali’s
book was more as a Hanbali version of Al Mawardi’s book. There is no definite proof
on which theorist issued his book first but al Mawardi book yielded the fame. Abi
Yaali stated in his version citing Ibn Hanbal, “installing the Caliph is an obligation”
(2000, p.19). He mentioned four necessary characteristics in the caliph “He has to be
from Quraysh … The second: he has to be eligible to be a judge: free, adult, sane,
knowledgeable, just. And the third condition: he has to be able to manage war,
politics and applying Hedoud (Islamic Sanctions according to sharia) … The fourth is
that he must be among the most knowledgeable and religious” (Abi Yaali, 2000, p.
20).
Al Juwayni also worked on the conditions of the caliph and the Electoral
College as well as the conditions for dismissing the caliph. He also gave due attention
to the case of the caliph’s absence and how Muslims should react to this situation in
his landmark “Ghiyath al Umam”. “If there wasn’t an Imam, and there was no ruler
who is knowledgeable and standing for the people, then the power has to be given to
10

the Ulama (Muslim Scholars). And people whatever their positions were have to get
back to the Ulama who have to take decisions in all the cases related to the territories.
If the people do this, then they had followed God’s guidance and the Ulama became
the rulers” (Juwayni, nd). Generally, Al Juwayni highlighted the importance of the
Ulama and considered them the heirs of power in case the legitimate caliph is absent.
The actual role the caliph played during the caliphate also varied significantly
from one caliph to another. Theoretically, the caliph was perceived as “not only the
temporal and spiritual … ruler, he was also God’s Deputy on Earth and thus was
qualified to comment on, or more importantly, reinterpret Sura, Hadith and Sunna”
(Liebl, 2009). Practically, the absolute powers granted to the first Caliphs were not
granted to all subsequent Caliphs. In many occasions, the Caliph was forced to respect
independent hereditary rule throughout vast areas of his empire. Moreover, on some
occasions the Caliph was a figurehead who could not exercise power outside his
palace (Caliphate, 2016). The Caliphate era also witnessed the announcement of more
than one Caliph in different territories, who thereupon waged wars against each other
and frequently allied with non-Muslims against their Muslim foes (D r , 2011).
Generally, the role of the Caliph varied along the 12 centuries of the Caliphate era in
accordance with his personality and the political context of his reign.
After the end of the Caliphate in the twentieth century, many predominantly
Muslim states legitimized their regimes by the Islamic religion and identified
themselves as Islamic States. Among them were the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and
Morocco, the militaristic regimes of Turabi and Zia-Ul-Haq in Sudan and Pakistan,
and the Islamist revolutionary Shiite regime in Iran.
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The Saudi monarchy was the oldest among those states. It was founded upon
an alliance between Mohamed Ibn Saud and Mohamed Ibn Abd Elwahab. This
alliance manifested in a role for Ulama in the newly founded state – a role that
continued and participated in shaping the laws and regimes throughout the 300-year
history of the kingdom (Kechichian, 1986). The Moroccan monarchy considered
being an offshoot of the prophet an asset that can be used to legitimize their regime.
King Hassan the second stated in the 1962 constitution that the king is “Amir
Elmo’mneen” – the prince of believers – and clearly stated a religious authority for
the king to protect religion (Zartman, 1965). This authority was maintained in the
later constitutions, including the more liberal 2011 constitution. Monarchies were not
the only Islamist regimes in the post caliphate era. In 1989, Col. Omar Hassan
Elbashir conducted a coup d’état in Sudan in association with The National Salvation
Front of Dr. Hassan Alturabi to install an Islamic government in Sudan inspired by
Alturabi’s ideas. The honeymoon between Elbashir and Alturabi didn’t last and
Alturabi was detained in 2000 (Burr & Collins, 2003). Maududi’s relation with ZiaUl-Haq’s coup d’état was luckier. Zia-Ul-Haq was inspired by Maududi’s teachings
in Pakistan and clearly announced that he is establishing an Islamist State in Pakistan.
Furthermore, he launched a Sharia-zation process aimed at Islamizing the Pakistani
society. Many tend to believe that Zia-Ul-Haq coup was not the beginning of the
Islamic State in Pakistan but it was Maududi’s ideas which influenced the state even
under Bhutto’s tenure (Kaul, 2002). The Iranian case was a unique case as the
religious ideologue himself was the leader of the revolution. Ayatollah Al-Khomeini
announced an Islamist State in Iran and introduced the concept of “Velayat-E Faqih”
as a temporarily substitute for the Imam of the Twelve Shiites. A more important
aspect of uniqueness in the Iranian regime is the Shiite faith, which to a great degree
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draws a concrete role for the Imam. As we can see, various forms of regimes were
labeled as Islamic regimes in the twentieth century, all of which share nothing but the
‘Islamic State’ label on few occasions.
But, does Islam really include a political regime? Are Islamic politics an
obligation upon Muslims or just an Ijtihad from scholars? Muslim scholars are
divided along the spectrum between two extremes. Scholars on the first extreme see
that Islam doesn’t include any political regime but rather general guidance and
teachings. Accordingly, the first extreme perceives Islam as a religion that is
completely compatible with democracy. On the other hand, the second extreme
believes that Islam includes answers for all questions and Muslims must follow Islam,
as a totalitarian regime, in every aspect of their life. There are many scholars with
diverse ideas who fall in the middle between the two extremes. Among them are
scholars who believe in democracy and the people’s right to choose as long as their
choices do not contradict Sharia. For the purposes of this study we will use the term
‘Islamists’ to describe those on the second extreme and we will focus on their
“totalitarian” aspect in the literature review.
Many scholars tend to agree that Islam does not include a political system.
Although Islam incorporates some values and ethics that can be applied to the
political realm, these values do not formulate a political system (Kirmanj, 2008;
Shavit, 2010). Islam did not address the most fundamental aspects of a political
system, such as the nature and role of government (Kirmanj, 2008). In 1925, an
Egyptian Islamic scholar, Ali Abd Elrazek, wrote a pivotal work in this regard: “Al
Islam wa Osoul Al Hokm (Islam and Foundations of Power),” in which he confirmed
that Islam doesn’t incorporate a specific political system. Furthermore, Abd Elrazek
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asserted that Islam can be perfectly combined with a secular state and is therefore
fully compatible with democracy (Ettmueller, 2006).
The compatibility between Islam and democracy has generated controversial
debates. Gamal El Din Al Afghani considered democracy the natural heir of the
Shoura (Consultation) (Soage, 2014). Hassan El Banna – the Muslim Brotherhood
founder – ran for Parliament twice and confirmed that the parliamentary system is the
closest to Islam (Soage, 2014). Other scholars were less enthusiastic about democracy
and instead preferred to use the term Shoura to assert the supremacy of Sharia over
the people’s choice. However, they did not deny the people’s right to express their
opinions and observations as long they do not contradict religion (Ex. Mohamed
Abdou, Rashid Reda, and Youssef Al Qaradawi). This approach was expressed in the
famous debate in the 1992 Cairo Book Fair over the civic and Islamic State when
Mohamed el Ghazaly said “This is the difference between Islamic democracy and
Western democracy: Islamic democracy sees that Shoura is the right of the people but
in the areas of Ijtihad for public good. Yet, whenever there is divine text which says
that the killer must be killed, I can’t say there is a room for Shoura” (Ghazaly, 1992).
Apparently, the supremacy of Sharia is a popular concept in some predominantly
Muslim countries. Gallup conducted a survey in 10 such predominantly Muslim
countries in 2006, asking Muslims if Sharia should be the only source of legislation.
66%, 60%, 54%, 52% of Egyptians, Pakistanis, Jordanians and Bangladeshis
respectively supported this while 24%, 21%, 39%, 39% of the same populations
perceived Sharia as one of the sources of legitimation but not the only source
(Mogahed, 2006). After 10 years, The Global Attitudes Survey concluded that 78%,
65%, 54%, 52% of Pakistanis, Palestinians, Jordanians and Malaysians respectively
believe that the rules in their countries should strictly follow the teachings of Quran
14

(Poushter, 2016). Generally, there are two trends accepting democracy in Islam: one
believes that Islam didn't impose certain political settings, which accordingly means
that democracy is fully compatible with Islam, and the other prefers the term Shoura,
which gives people the right of choice in identifying what does not contradict Sharia.
There is also the second extreme that refuses the idea of democracy completely and
believes in Islamism as a totalitarian political ideology.
The term Islamism was re-coined (it was previously used to define Islam as
religion vis-à-vis Mohamedism, which considered Muslims a group) in France in the
late 1970s. The term was coined to replace the controversial term “fundamentalism”
which was mainly used to describe Christians who depended only on the Bible. Many
philosophers believed that the term “fundamentalists” does not capture the essence of
the new revivalist Muslim movements that did not depend only on Quran but on many
other sources as well. The term began to be used in English literature in the 1980s
(Kramer, 2003). “In 1993, the political scientist Louis Cantori likewise argued that
fundamentalism conveys a sense of extremism and dismissal. In reference to Islam, in
the world of scholarship, and now internally within U.S. agencies, it is being
abandoned as being prejudicial and polemical. Instead, the term Islamism is used
increasingly to denote the political manifestation of the religion of Islam. “Islamism”
permits one to more dispassionately make distinctions between extremist and
mainstream Islam” (Kramer, 2003). Generally, Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism
are currently used as interchangeable synonyms to differentiate them from Islam.
Accordingly, this thesis acknowledges the difference between Islam and
Islamism. Islam is the religion while Islamism is a social movement and ideology that
has all the characteristics of a totalitarian regime as it provides both solutions for all
the problems of mankind and order to human affairs (Kirmanj, 2008). Hansen and
15

Kainz (2007) hold a comparison based on reconstructing the political theory of Adolf
Hitler, Karl Marx and Sayyid Qutb - the Father of Islamic Fundamentalism - to find
out that the three theories share the same basic structure. The three ideologies believe
in this eternal war between good and evil in which the evil threatens the existence of
mankind; it is the role of the good to stand against it and rid the world of it so as to
create the utopian classless society. Hansen and Kainz conclude that Islamism is a
totalitarian ideology that shares the same basic structure of the other totalitarian
ideologies and causes the same threat those ideologies posed to mankind (Hansen,
2007). Islamist totalitarianism is not planned to be imposed solely on Muslims;
Islamists want their ideology to prevail all over the world, thereby converting the
whole world to Dar Al Islam (Home of Islam) and installing Sharia as a replacement
of all other man-made legislations (Tibi, 2007). Accordingly, Islamism is perceived
by many scholars as a totalitarian ideology that interferes in all the aspects of life of
citizens. Moreover, it is willing to enforce its ideology all over the world in a way that
can be compared to Marxism and Nazism.
In 1992, Al Qaradawi issued a booklet “Inclusiveness of Islam” explaining al
Banna’s opinion on the inclusion of Islam. “Islam which was issued by the God didn’t
ignore any aspect of life. It includes all the aspects of life: materialistic and spiritual,
individual or communal … Islamic Sharia has to govern all the acts of individuals, as
there is no act or case unless it has a guidance in Sharia … Islam is a message for the
entire life” (Qaradawi, 1992). Roots of the totalitarian aspect of Islamism can be
traced to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyah. He interpreted Quran and Sunnah directly
without giving much attention to previous Islamic regimes. Ibn Taymiyah asserted
that an Islamic State must fight the unbelievers and enforce Sharia on all its citizens.
Ibn Taymiyah stated in his book “al Siyassa al Sharaaiyah” that “the most serious type
16

of obligatory Jihad is the one against the unbelievers and against those who refuse to
abide by certain prescription of the Sharia, like those who refuse to pay zakaah, the
Kharijites and the like. This Jihad is obligatory if it is carried out on our initiative and
also if it is waged as defense” (Bostom, 2005). Moreover, he sees the Islamic State
“as a coercive mean to expand and spread Islam beyond its borders while maintaining
the doctrinal purity of Islamic practices within its borders” (Khan, 2004). This
totalitarian aspect of Islamism enhanced the need for a Caliph as he is, according to
Ibn Taymiyah, the only authority that may wage Jihad and apply Sharia. Al Juwayni
introduced the “governance of the scholars” (Welayet El Ulama) concept in Sunni
Islam before Ibn Taymiyah. Al Juwayni developed this concept as an answer to a
question regarding who may substitute the Caliph in case the Caliphate is not
installed. Al Juwayni asserted that Welayet El Ulama can be applied to compensate
for the absence of a Caliph (Khir, 2007).
The characteristics of the Islamist State were not the only issue on which
scholars did not reach a consensus. The possibility of establishing the Islamist State
was also debatable. Hallaq (2012) argued in his landmark “the impossible state” that
the “Islamic State judged by any standard definition of what the modern state
represents is both an impossibility and a contradiction in terms” (Hallaq, 2012). He
clarified that the paradigm of the modern state severely contradicts the popular model
of Islamist State and predicted that in case an Islamist State is announced, it wont be
able to survive in the current global order – a prediction that proved to be true with
IS’s Islamist State.
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1.2. Islamist Movements:
As Islamism began to grow and become a global ideology, Islamists seem to
agree on basic objectives. Armajani introduced six objectives which characterize
Islamists: 1) Sharia must govern every aspect of life in Muslim countries; 2)
Governments must consist of true Muslims who obey all the pillars of Islam; 3) These
governments may be either democratic or ruled by a single Emir; 4) Financial and
political supports must be given exclusively to Islamic schools and universities and
other forms of education have to be banned; 5) Schools must teach Quran, Hadith,
Sunna, and Sharia next to the other sciences from an Islamist perspective; 6) Islam
must be the moral basis for all aspects of the society (Armajani, 2012). Armajani’s
conditions came in harmony with the seven objectives announced by Zawahiri in
“Supporting the Islam Document.” Zawahiri published the document in 2012 and
urged Islamist movements to unite around those objectives to face the crusaders: 1)
Working to liberate every occupied Muslim land; 2) Applying Sharia and refusing
manmade legislations and international regimes; 3) Working to stop plundering
resources from Muslim territories; 4) Supporting the Muslims in their revolutions and
raising the awareness on Sharia; 5) Supporting every tyrannized in the globe against
the tyrants; 6) Working to install the Caliphate which doesn’t recognize nationalism
and borders; 7) Working on uniting the Islamist forces to achieve those objectives.
(Zawahiri, Supporting Islam Document, 2012).
In order to achieve those goals, Islamist movements are utilizing all the tools they
can use (Kelsay, 2009). Generally, three tools can be used to achieve those goals: 1)
Participating in the political realm and running for elections (Ex. Muslim
Brotherhood); 2) Enforcing this regime by power (Ex. IS); 3) Motivating people and
paving the way to fulfill those objectives (Ex. Qaeda). Those three movements are
18

working on the ground to achieve the Islamists’ objectives which are a subject of
agreement between the three groups. It is important to notice here that this agreement
on the core objectives doesn’t imply an agreement on many other issues (among them
the Islamist political system as the hypothesis reveals). Those disagreements could be
a main reason behind the absence of cooperation between the three movements and
even the mutual accusations and warfare among them on some occasions.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s announced objective is to establish a state ruled by
Sharia with a democratic system protecting a wide range of civil liberties (Mecham,
2009). This objective has not always been the discourse of the Brotherhood’s figures.
Sayyid Qutb for example, who was one of the prominent leaders of the Brotherhood,
believed that submission to laws drafted by men is an act of unbelievers and that the
state must submit to the divine will (Soage, 2014). The fifth general guide of the
Brotherhood, Mustafa Mashur, warned that the Brotherhood is temporarily accepting
the political pluralism and that they will reject it after the Islamic government is
established (Soage, 2014). The Brotherhood usually states that it needs to achieve its
goals gradually and legally (Mecham, 2009). Generally, among the contemporary
Islamist movements, the Brotherhood is the most diverse in its announced visions for
the Islamist State. This may be explained by their gradualist approach.
In June, 2014, Abu Mohamed Adnani - ISIS Spokesman at the time - announced
the re-establishment of the Caliphate and declared Abu Bakr Bughdadi as the new
Caliph. Adnani clarified that there is no legal constraint or excuse to postpone the
announcement of the Caliph. He clarified that Ahl Al Hal wa Al Aqd - people of
authority - agreed to nominate Bughdadi as the Caliph and it is incumbent upon every
Muslim to pledge allegiance to him (Jihadist, 2014). The declaration of the Caliphate
appealed to many Islamists from all over the world including Islamists who live in
19

Europe and United States (Cragin, 2015). Practically, the movement’s success in
recruiting, mobilizing, and gaining territories forced the international community in
September 2014 to establish the global coalition to degrade and defeat IS. IS’s
exceptionalism results from their “four principal manifestations – as a guerrilla army,
Sunni revanchist political movement, millenarian Islamist cult and ruthless
administrator of territory” (Fromson, 2015). IS is always interested to introduce itself
as an operating Islamist State that is already installed and welcoming Islamists to join
and support it.
Qaeda started from where Qutb ended. Qaeda denied the men right to draft laws
and considered it a divine right. Ayman Zawahiri – the current Qaeda leader –
considered democracy a new religion and thus following this new religion illegitimate
(Soage, 2014). Al Maqdassi issued a booklet titled Democracy is a Religion where he
said “democracy is pagan innovated religion and its followers are either gods who
legislate or followers who worship those gods.” The problem that Qaeda perceives is
the Jahiliyah - not following Islam - in Muslim societies. Salafism - looking back to
Islam in the time of the prophet - is their methodological approach to alleviate the
condition of Jahiliyah. The action they take to solve the problem is the Jihad and in
order to prepare for Jihad, they did the Hijra (migration). Bin Laden says: “We left
our country on jihad in the path of Allah, and it is for the sake of Allah, praise and
glory be upon Him, that we made this blessed Hijra to facilitate the institutionalization
of Sharia” (Turner, 2010). This is why Turner described Salafism, Jahiliyah, Hijra,
and Jihad as the four tenets of the ideology of Qaeda (Turner, 2010). Actually, Qaeda
believed that in order to combat the current Jahiliyah, Hijra had to take place to
prepare the Muslims to follow the Salafist doctrine, after which they can start the
continuous Jihad to establish the Caliphate.
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The Brotherhood endorsed democracy in several circumstances as a strategy to
install the Islamist State. Although IS and Qaeda may look quite similar in their
intolerance of democracy as a strategy to achieve the Islamist State, they have their
disagreements that led to a warfare between IS and Jabhet Elnusra, a Qaeda affiliate
in Syria. Mendelsohn (2016) described this warfare as “Jihad’s Civil War” and
explained it by the difference in priorities between IS, which prioritizes the
reintroduction of Caliphate, and Qaeda, which “views this as a step to be postponed
until conditions guarantees its survival” (Mendelsohn, 2016). The older Qaeda
“looked to slowly and carefully dismantle the Western civilization through dispersed
suicide bombing and raids” in order to pave the way for the reintroduction of the
Caliphate, while the younger more idealistic and impatient IS preferred to conquer
territories and announce the Caliphate - and consequently declared war on those who
deny the IS Caliph’s legitimacy (Shafer-Ray, 2015). The main difference between IS
and Qaeda is that IS sees no excuse to postpone announcing the Caliphate while
Qaeda believes that announcing the Caliphate must be an outcome of a continuous
Hijra and Jihad.
The literature discussing the Islamic State followed two frameworks: an
empirical framework that focuses on studying the previously established, or the
contemporarily existing, Islamic States (ex. Iran (Chehabi, 2001) & Sudan (Gallab,
2008)), and a normative approach concerned with describing the utopian Islamic State
through quoting the works of the influential Ulama. Rather than studying the
ideological vision of the state they are working to install, the Islamist movements that
work to install their model of Islamist State were studied as social movements.
Describing the ideal Islamic State depending on the visions of the major Islamist
movements is a gap in the literature that this thesis tries to fill.
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2. Theoretical Framework

This thesis sheds light on the theory of state as perceived by the various Islamist
movements. Yet, a theoretical framework has to set the map for deducting those
movements’ vision of their utopian state. Two main approaches can be applied. On
one hand is studying the existing states that those movements established (ex. IS state
in Iraq and Syria) or the states that were established under their supervision (ex.
Afghanistan under Taliban and few city states in Syria) empirically. On the other
hand, deducing those movements’ vision of the utopian state happens through
analyzing their literature from an institutional framework perspective.
Being in power amidst a hostile environment is a justified excuse that Islamist
movements may use to explain certain practices that deviates from their theoretical
doctrine. Moreover, the data collected from Islamist-ruled territories is usually highly
biased as it usually does not come from neutral sources; in fact, it originates through
propaganda, either by the movements, or (negative propaganda) against them. Even
the interviews conducted with citizens who used to live under the Islamist rule are
highly biased due to the citizens’ political orientation. Hence, following an empirical
approach would encounter many difficulties that may draw a distorted image for the
Islamist State as perceived by Islamist movements.
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This thesis’s theoretical framework is guided by Aref’s paper on “The knowledge
base of the Islamist political regimes”. This theoretical framework introduces the
regulations that has to be taken in consideration in deducing the Islamist movements
vision for the Islamist political regime. The paper clarifies the reasons that led to the
absence of concrete understanding for the Islamist state. The paper clarifies that the
modern Islamist political theories came as a reaction to the west and not based on
deep research in the classic Muslim theories and literature.
Aref’s paper introduces two main hypotheses that has to be take in consideration:
the first hypothesis is that most of the modern Islamist literature tried to build their
theories on the basis of the western literature which give the priority to the political
regime rather than the community in fostering the change; the second hypothesis is
that there is no one concrete Islamist political regime. Instead, there are Islamic
guidelines that set the base for numerous possible Islamic political regimes.
Based on these two hypotheses, Aref introduced, six major issues that caused the
distortion in the understanding of the Islamic political regime:
1. The methodology of introducing the Islamic political regime in the modern literature. 2. The
difficulties related with resources on the Islamic political regime. 3.The absence of details on the
Islamic political regime in Quran. 4. The basic role of the society in Islam and the marginal role of
the state. 5. Giving religious holiness to historical incidents. 6. Dealing with cotemporary
experiences. (al Khateeb, 2005, p. 119)
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Aref concluded his paper by confirming that Islamist movements generally
perceive reaching political power as installing the Islamist regime. The Islamist
movements consider no alternative for installing their Islamist State but reaching the
political power. This theoretical framework assists us in understanding the reasons
behind the disagreement of the Islamist movements on the Islamist State. Moreover, it
directs the thesis to focus on the movements’ political behavior to understand their
vision for the institutions of the Islamist State rather than focusing on their societal
activities.
Accordingly, this thesis deduces the three major Islamist movements visions of
the Islamist State by analyzing three texts for each movement. Special focus is on the
texts’ vision concerning the institutions of the Islamist State and the reasons behind
the movement’s disagreement with others on this vision. This leads us to explain the
methodological approach followed to deduce the characteristics of the Islamic State as
perceived by each movement.
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3. Methodological Approach
The objective of this section is to explain the methodology used to deduce the
characteristics of the model Islamist State as perceived by the various Islamist
movements. The Islamist movement’s prominent texts and speeches comprise the
wisdom of the movement and its main teachings, which are widespread among its
members. Accordingly, analyzing the content of the major movements’ texts and
speeches is the method we chose for this thesis. This should take in consideration the
choice of widely accepted texts written by historical figures of the movements who
represent the movements’ “mainstream” figures.
This thesis analyzes the content of the discourse issued by the three major Islamist
movements – units of analysis – to deduce the characteristics of their model for the
institutions of Islamist State – variable. This thesis also compares the three models in
order to answer the research question and deduce the points of agreement and
disagreement between the three models of Islamist State.
This qualitative content analysis focuses on the chapters discussing the vision of
the Islamist State in texts that were chosen while taking in consideration the objective
of answering the research questions of this thesis and highlighting the reasons behind
the choice of words to explain the various movements’ vision of the Islamist State.
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Accordingly, chapters from three mainstream texts for each movement of the three
will be analyzed to clarify their vision for the institutions of the Islamist State and
some of the features of the movement. The Brotherhood will be studied in three
periods: during the foundation under Hassan Al-Banna through one of his speeches,
during their second crisis when their assemblies and speeches were not tolerated
through a chapter in a book for Sayyid Qutb, and during Morsi’s campaign for
presidency in Egypt through his electoral program. Concerning IS, The founding
speech will be analyzed in addition to two articles posted in their official English
speaking periodical “Dabiq,” Qaeda vision will be deduced by analyzing two
speeches by the two leaders of Qaeda: Ayman Zawahiri and Bin Laden, in addition to
a Fatwa issued by al-Shinqiti in which he clarifies Qaeda’s position from IS’s claimed
caliphate. The common features of the institutions of the Islamist State in each
movement’s materials will be highlighted and compared to the other movements’
visions for the institutions of the Islamist State.
Each chapter in this thesis starts with a historical review of the movement,
generally introducing its history without focusing on the movement’s vision of the
Islamist State. This is followed by the analysis of the three chosen texts, which will
include information on the author as well as the text’s historical context. Each chapter
ends in a conclusion and a summary that clarify the movement’s vision for the
Islamist State.
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4. The Islamist State Model for
The Muslim Brotherhood
“We want: Muslim individual, Muslim home, Muslim nation and Muslim
government” (El-Banna, nd)
The Muslim Brotherhood is widely believed to be the mother of all contemporary
Islamist movements. The teachings of its famous ideologue “Sayyed Qutb” and its
founder “Hassan Al-Banna” are used by many Jihadists all over the globe. In order to
explore the Brotherhood’s vision of the Islamist State, this chapter starts with a brief
historical background on the Muslim Brotherhood since its foundation. This is
followed by analyzing three texts written by Al-Banna, Qutb and the electoral
program of Morsi. During the foundation of the Brotherhood, Al-Banna issued a
message in front of the fifth congress of the Brotherhood on his vision for the
“Brotherhood program” that compares the constitutional regime under the monarchy
in Egypt with his vision for the Islamist regime. Al-Banna was skeptical about the
Egyptian partisan system and many other features of the Egyptian political regime in
his era. Yet he was generally tolerant about the political settings in his message. On
the contrary, Sayyed Qutb showed zero tolerance to the whole national and
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international political regimes in his landmark “Milestones.” He considered
democracy as a new religion which contradicts with the basic teachings of Islam as it
denies the legislative authority of God and complies to human will against that of the
God. Morsi showed a different version of the Brotherhood’s vision for the political
regime in his electoral program for presidency. Morsi’s electoral program embraced
most of the Egyptian state institutions and complied to the political settings. This
chapter concludes by deducing the Brotherhood’s vision for the institutions of the
Islamist State.
4.1. Historical Background:
In March 1923, Hassan al-Banna, created the society of the Muslim Brothers that
aimed at the rejuvenation of Islam (Britannica, Hassan al-Banna, 1998). The early
society of the Muslim Brothers was characterized by the appointment of people from
the lower classes in leading positions. The Brotherhood’s first activity was an evening
school that focused on religious education. And the Brotherhood’s first major project
was the construction of a mosque in 1931. The fundraising campaigns and the
dedication of society members to their objective received favorable attention in the
press (Lia, 1998). In 1932 al-Banna decided to move to Cairo. By then, the
brotherhood had three active branches. After six years from al-Banna migration to
Cairo the Brotherhood grew to have more than three hundred branches across Egypt.
In the mid-1930s, the Brotherhood developed a formal hierarchical structure
giving wide executive and spiritual powers to the General Guide. The structure also
included the General Guidance Bureau and organized the local branches into districts.
The Brotherhood’s memberships were classified into four categories: activist, worker,
associate, and assistant. Membership fees were dependent on the income of the
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member (Lia, 1998). In the late 1930s, a crisis erupted in the Brotherhood society.
Some members pushed for the Brotherhood to quit its pragmatic agenda and form a
military wing and participate in the confrontation with the British rule. Al-Banna was
in favor of building the physical capacities of the young members without forging a
military wing. This conflict encouraged some of the most active cadres in the society
to leave it and form the rival organization “Mohamed’s Youth”. After the crisis alBanna decided to create the Brotherhood military wing: “the Secret Appartus” (Lia,
1998). During Second World War, the Brotherhood’s position was not in favor of the
British. The government imposed martial law and public figures including Hassan alBanna were detained for short whiles. The Brotherhood avoided confrontation and
preferred to keep a low profile while expanding its membership base and extending its
social welfare programs. The Wafd government called for elections in 1942 and alBanna declared his candidacy. The Wafd government pressured him to withdraw in
exchange for normalizing the activities of the Brotherhood and curtailing prostitution
(Mitchell, 1969). The government that conducted the 1945 elections was not as open
as the Wafd government. Al-Banna and other candidates from the Brotherhood ran
during the 1945 election and were defeated even in their stronghold in Isma’illiyya.
The 1945 elections are widely believed to be rigged elections (Mitchell, 1969).
The years from 1945 to 1948 witnessed further expansion of the Brotherhood
society as well as turbulent relations with the governments and with British
authorities. “In March 1948, members of the secret apparatus assassinated Ahmed alKhazindar who had given a prison sentence to a Muslim Brother for attacking British
soldiers” (Mitchell, 1969). Generally, the Brotherhood was engaged in armed struggle
against the British and in the “Palestinian war”. In December 1948, and after
discovering caches of bombs and weapons, the Egyptian government decided to
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dissolute the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s leadership claimed that the weapons
accumulated were to be used in the “Palestinian war”. The government accused the
Brotherhood of preparing for an armed insurgency. Few weeks later, a Muslim
Brother assassinated Prime Minister Nuqrashi. Soon after, the government unveiled
an attempt by a Muslim Brother to bomb a courthouse. Al-Banna’s reaction to this
was to condemn the violence and assert that those acts do not represent society.
Meanwhile, Al-Banna mentioned police brutality against the Brothers and the war in
Palestine as reasons that stimulate violence. In February 1949, Al-Banna himself was
the victim of a successful assassination assault. The confrontation between the
Brotherhood and the government was an open one. After a wave of arrests by the
government, a group of Brothers made an unsuccessful trial to assassinate Prime
Minister “Abd Elhadi.” By July 1949, some 4,000 Brothers were in prison. It took two
years for the Brotherhood to choose the successor of Al-Banna.
Hassan Al-Hudaybi, a judge who was known for his rejection of violence, was
chosen to be the second General Guide. He started his reign by standing against the
secret apparatus and alienating it from the society (Zollner, 2009). He went further to
refusing the official participation of the brotherhood in any confrontation with the
British after Nahhas’s decision to unilaterally abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of
1936. Al-Hudaybi issued a statement repudiating the riots that took place in January
1952 in Cairo. On July 1952 the Free Officers took power, overthrowing the
monarchy. The Brotherhood that had previous cordial relations with the junta
supported the army movement. In exchange, the junta’s decision to dissolve the
political parties and organizations considered the Brotherhood an exception (Zollner,
2009). This first tension between the Brotherhood and the new regime occurred when
Nasser decided to supported the opposition in the Brotherhood against Hudaybi. In
30

January 1954, Nasser accused the Brotherhood of planning to overthrow the
government and decided to dissolve the Brotherhood and arrest Al-Hudaybi and
hundreds of the society members. The struggle over power between Naguib and
Nasser encouraged Naguib to respond positively to a petition by Hudaybi to restore
the society and set its detained members free. Al-Hudaybi supported Naguib (Zollner,
2009) and the Brothers were losing the trust in Nasser, who was gradually stripping
Naguib of his powers. Based on their distrust in Nasser, some brothers secretly
restored the Secret Apparatus. On 26 October, 1954, an unsuccessful assassination
attempt against Nasser opened the gates of hell. Nasser accused the Brotherhood of
planning and executing the assassination. “The organization was officially dissolved,
the headquarters burned and thousands of its member arrested” (Mitchell, 1969). AlHudaybi was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.
The Brotherhood’s second crisis lasted till 1971. During the years between 1954
and 1971, many Brothers escaped Nasser’s regime and migrated to Saudi Arabia
among other countries. Sayyed Qutb issued his controversial books amidst this crisis
in which he refused democracy and considered it a religion that no real Muslim is
allowed to believe in (Zollner, 2009). Sadat came to power in 1971 showing more
tolerance to the Brotherhood. Brotherhood detainees were gradually released and in
1975 a general amnesty released those few who remained behind the bars. Umar
Talmasani succeeded Al-Hudaybi after his death in 1973. In 1976, the Brotherhood
was allowed to issue its monthly newspaper, Al-Da’wa, yet their second demand of
operating legally as a political party was refused. In 1980, the government amended
the constitution to state that Sharia is the main source of all legislation. It is widely
believed that there was an agreement between Sadat and the Brotherhood to tolerate
their presence in exchange for their assistance in containing the secular opposition
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forces (Ibrahim, 1982). Moreover, in many occasions the Islamists condemned the
militant Islamist groups that appeared in Egypt in the 1970s. It is also worth
mentioning that the Brotherhood made tactical alliances with other forces on some
occasions, particularly in the last years of Sadat’s tenure (Camp David
demonstrations, Bread Riots, etc.).
The Brotherhood founded an efficient network of social services that yielded
increasing popularity for the movement under Sadat’s successor, Mubarak. Mubarak
didn’t introduce a radical change in Sadat’s policy with the Brotherhood. Mubarak’s
30 years witnessed six General Guides. Talmasani agreed to ally with the Wafd Party
in the 1984 Parliamentary elections. Their alliance gained more votes than the entire
opposition. When Talmasani passed away in 1986, his successor Abu Elnasr decided
to repeat the experience by allying with the Labor Party and repeated the success of
yielding more votes than the entire opposition. In 1992, Egypt witnessed an
earthquake that revealed the inability of the state institutions to deal with catastrophes.
The Brotherhood’s social networks operated efficiently and provided the victims with
the needed financial and medical assistance. The Brotherhood’s rising popularity and
dominance over several professional associations rang the bell and the government
resorted to repressive measures again starting from 1993 (al-Awadi, 2009). In 1993 a
legislation was issued that enabled putting the professional associations under the
government’s guardianship. 1995 and 1996 witnessed the first military trials for
Brotherhood members under Mubarak, under the charge of reviving a banned
organization and the planning to overthrow the government (al-Awadi, 2009). 1996
witnessed the death of Abu Elnasr and the appointment of Mustafa Mashhour as the
fifth general guide. A new schism occurred in the Brotherhood when some of the
Brotherhood’s middle-generation leaders decided to leave and form a new political
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party “El-Wassat.” The party didn’t receive an approval under Mubarak in spite of its
‘secular’ outlook. The Brotherhood won 17 seats in the Egyptian Parliamentary
elections in 2000. Brotherhood members ran for the elections as independent
candidates under judiciary supervision of the elections. In 2002, Maamoun Hudayebi
succeeded Mashhour as the sixth General Guide. His tenure was the shortest as he
died in 2004 to be succeeded by Mahdi Akef. In 2005, the Brotherhood achieved its
largest success under Mubarak when it received 88 seats (20%) in the Egyptian
Parliament. A new wave of media discrediting and military trials started after this
achievement (al-Awadi, 2009). Mahdi Akef was the first General Guide who decided
to leave the office willingly in 2010 for his successor Mohamed Badiae, the
Brotherhood’s eighth General Guide. The repression wave was followed by the 2010
parliamentary elections, widely believed to be rigged. In the second round of the 2010
elections, the Brotherhood decided to boycott the elections.
In January 2011, young Egyptians hit the streets announcing their discontent with
the political and economic circumstances in Egypt. The Brotherhood announced their
participation in the second round of demonstration on the 28th of January. Most of the
Brotherhood’s leadership was arrested before then. During the uprising, many of the
Brotherhood’s leaders were able to escape the prisons and join the uprising. After
Mubarak’s ouster, a honeymoon started between the Brotherhood and the ruling
SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces). In 2012, the Brotherhood dominated the
parliamentary elections by securing 43.7% of the seats. Harbingers of tensions
between SCAF and the Brotherhood came when the SCAF delayed the presidential
elections and the Brotherhood were pushing to have the elections as soon as possible
(Al-Anani, 2015). The Brotherhood’s candidate for presidency, Mohamed Morsi, was
elected in June, 2012. In August he replaced the SCAF leader, Tantawy, with Abd el33

Fatah el-Sisi. On the 30th of June 2013, huge demonstrations erupted and el-Sisi
announced a road map and detained Mohamed Morsi. Since July 2013, the
Brotherhood went in an open confrontation with the post-July regime in Egypt.
Hundreds of brothers were killed and thousands were detained. Badie was detained
and Ezzat became the acting General Guide. The Brotherhood witnessed a division
over Ezzat’s leadership and the means of resistance in 2015. Yet, both factions
recognized Badie as the General Guide and Morsi as the legitimate president.

4.2. Text 1: Al-Banna’s Message on the Brotherhood Program:
Al-Banna’s messages are widely respected among the Brotherhood members,
as they are perceived as the founding General Guide teachings to the Brothers. The
messages are also popular in other Islamist societies. In the following pages, we focus
on al-Banna message in the Brotherhood’s fifth congress. The message clarifies the
Brotherhood’s program and position from the main political institutions including:
constitution, laws, and caliphate.
4.2.1. The Author:
The author of the message is the founding General Guide of the Muslims
Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna. He was born in 1906 in a religious family. He
graduated from the faculty of Dar Al-Ulum, “a prestigious teachers’ training
seminary in Cairo affiliated with al-Azhar University” (Levy, 2014) in 1927 to work
as an Arabic language teacher in Ismailia, where he established the Brotherhood
society in 1928. In 1932, he moved back to Cairo and resumed his career there. Levy
clarifies Al-Banna’s role in establishing the Brotherhood as we know it by saying:
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“Al-Bannā’s call to Islam as the solution to the Egyptian and Muslim malaise
appealed to many disappointed members of the public. He reckoned that Egypt should
interpret Islam according to modern conditions and should use it as a leading force
that would guide it to progress. He shrewdly framed his ideology as an authentic
alternative to the liberal path, suiting it to the cultural crisis reverberating in
Egypt. Al-Bannā’s religious call marked the beginning of the society’s politicization
of Islam, injecting it with a new dynamism that would eventually thrust it into the
forefront of Egyptian public affairs” (Levy, 2014).

4.2.2. Text 1 Context:
The message was delivered vocally by Al-Banna in the fifth congress of the
Muslim Brotherhood society. The congress was attended by four thousand Brother
depegates and attracted huge media coverage (al-Amin, 2014). The congress was held
in February 1939, a few months before Mohamed’s Youth left the Brotherhood.
Apparently, the debate on the Brotherhood’s program was ongoing so Al-Banna
decided to clarify it and also announce his position vis-à-vis many controversial
issues.
The message was delivered in Arabic and was published among Al-Banna’s
messages. It is available on many Arabic websites and considered one of the main
references for understanding the Brotherhood program. The message is composed of
nine chapters: The Brotherhood: An idea in four souls; Islam of the Muslim
Brotherhood; the Brotherhood: Comprehensive reformation idea; the characteristics of
the Brotherhood Daawa; Frankness; when is our next step; the program of the Muslim
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Brotherhood; the Brotherhood and the various institutions; and the Brotherhood’s
position from the European countries.
In this analysis, the chapter on the program of the Muslim Brotherhood will be
analyzed. The chapter discusses six topics, namely: The objective and the means; the
Brotherhood, the power and the revolution; the Brotherhood and the ruling; the
Brotherhood and the constitution; the Brotherhood and the legislations; and the
Brotherhood and the Caliphate. The text will be summarized and the relevant
information for the research question will be deduced.
4.2.3. Text 1 Analysis:
Al-Banna commenced this message by stating that the Brotherhood’s
objective was to form a new generation that believes in the rightful teachings of Islam
and works to apply those teachings in all the aspects of life. He defined the mean to
achieve this objective as raising the supporters to become role models for others and
hence alter the traditions.
Al-Banna considered power an objective for every Muslim; he used Quranic
verses to underline the importance of powerful Muslims. Yet, he clarified that power
is established on three levels. On the first level comes the power of belief, on the
second comes the power of unity, and on the third level comes the power of arms and
weapons. Al-Banna asserted that the Brotherhood may use the arms power if there is
no other alternative and if they are sure that they achieved the first and second levels
of powers (Al-Banna, 1939, p. 2). Concerning the revolutions, Al-Banna clarified that
the Brotherhood does not believe in forging revolutions but they do believe that if no
reformation takes place, a revolution may be expected.
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Furthermore, Al-Banna clearly stated that the Brotherhood is pursuing
legislative and executive powers. He confirmed that preaching will be in vain if the
legislative and executive powers are working against God’s will. He considered the
silence of the Islamist reformists a crime – the Brotherhood has to rise and take the
executive power from those who don’t comply to Islam (Al-Banna, 1939, p. 2). He
mentioned that if there are others who are able to rule with an Islamist program, the
Brotherhood will support them. But, if there is no alternative to those who don’t
comply with God’s orders, then the Brotherhood will step in. He added that the
Brotherhood is smarter than ruling in this times. It has to wait till its principles prevail
before standing for ruling.
Before the Brotherhood’s congress, Saleh Ashmawi, Editor in Chief of elNazir magazine – the Brotherhood’s magazine at the time – issued an article
criticizing the constitutions and considered it un-Islamic. The government criticized
Ashmawi’s article. Al-Banna started his words on the constitution by confirming that
Ashmawi’s position is personal and does not reflect the Brotherhood’s position. AlBanna considered non-contradiction with Islam as the principle of having a
constitution. Moreover, he considered constitutional regimes to be the most
compatible ones with Islam (Al-Banna, 1939, p. 3). However, Al-Banna criticized the
ambiguity of the Egyptian constitution on many topics, particularly its articles on
elections.
Al-Banna’s position on the legislations was stronger and clearer. He declared
that the Egyptian legislations are incompatible with Islam. Furthermore, he clarified
that Islam is associated with legislations which came in Quran and Sunna, whereas
Egyptian legislations collide not only with Islam but with the constitution, which
states that Islam is the religion of the state. He added that the Brotherhood will never
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accept such legislations and they will use “every mean” to replace them with just
Islamic legislations (Al-Banna, 1939, p. 5).
The Brotherhood’s position on the Caliphate was also a subject that Al-Banna
clarified in this message. He stated that the presence of a Caliphate is essential for
Islam. Moreover, he considered that restoring the Caliphate is a priority in the Muslim
Brotherhood program. Nevertheless, he confirmed that preparations, including pacts
and conferences, have to be accomplished before restoring the Caliphate. He
considered the agreement on the Imam to be the final step before restoring the
Caliphate. He also considered the Imam to be “God’s shadow on earth” (Al-Banna,
1939, p. 7).
Generally, the message referred to Quran and Sunnah in almost every section.
Al-Banna was keen on showing that he does not work for the Brotherhood as much as
he works for Islam generally. In his discourse, he focused on showing that the
Brotherhood is not searching for office for itself; rather, he is searching for installing
the Islamic legislation. He manipulated his discourse on the constitution by showing
that he tolerates the constitution – indicating how he probably learned from
Ashmawy’s crisis – while attacking the legislations and labeling it as non-Islamic.
In conclusion, Al-Banna’s message reflected the Brotherhood’s position on
many basic issues. He showed that installing the Caliphate is not just an objective for
the Brotherhood but an obligation on Muslims in general. He also confirmed that
Islam came with its legislations and that Muslims have to comply to Islamic
legislations as found in the Quran and Sunna. He explained that Muslims have to
pursue physical power only after achieving the powers of belief and unity, and that
the resort to the physical power must happen only if there are no alternatives. He also
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stated that preaching is in vain if the legislative and executive authorities continue
working against the Islamic agenda. Al-Banna highlighted his gradualist approach by
putting conditions and steps that have to be achieved before accomplishing any of the
objectives that he clarified in his message. Finally, Al-Banna was looking to restore
the Caliphate that is governed by Islamic legislations through all means. Yet, he was
not ready to lose what he achieved from 1928 to 1939. This explains why he endorsed
a gradualist approach. Al-Banna’s gradualist approach was to ensure that he will
neither collide with the Egyptians nor the regime.
4.3.Text 2: Qutb’s Milestones:
Amidst the Brotherhood’s second crisis, Sayyed Qutb issued one of the main
references of the Jihadist movements. Qutb’s book is not officially recognized as a
bible for the Brotherhood. On the contrary, Hudaybi issued Duat La Qudat (Preachers
not Judges) to refute Qutb’s arguments. Despite this, the Brotherhood “insists on
retaining Sayyid Qutb within its pantheon and on the reading lists for its members”
(Brown, 2010). It is widely believed that Qutbians and Bannians within the
Brotherhood are competing to enforce their ideas. However, this classification is
arguably a shallow interpretation for the eagles and pigeons dichotomy.
4.3.1. The Author
In 2006, the Combating Terrorism Center launched a “citation analysis”
project to figure out who the most cited Jihadist ideologues in the Islamist literature
are. After analyzing the texts, Sayyed Qutb earned the title of “the most cited modern
Islamist thinker” (McCants, 2006). Sayyed Qutb and Hassan Al-Banna were born in
the same year, 1906. Qutb was born in Asyut in Upper Egypt. Both of them studied in
the faculty of Dar Al-Ulum, “a prestigious teachers’ training seminary in Cairo
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affiliated with al-Azhar University” (Levy, 2014), and worked in the field of
education. Qutb graduated in 1932 from Dar Al-Ulum while Al-Banna graduated in
1927. Qutb’s relatively late graduation date was due to financial difficulties that led
him to work as a primary school teacher before completing his university degree.
Later, Qutb became known for publishing articles on Arabic literature in Egyptian
magazines. In this phase, he was not affiliated with the Brotherhood. He was a big fan
of Abbas Mahmoud El-Akkad and he considered himself one of Akkad’s pupils. The
radical change in Qutb’s life occurred when he was sent by the ministry of education
on a study trip to the United States of America in 1948. During his study in the United
States, he wrote articles that criticized the American culture and showed how the
materialistic American contributions were not met with values or principles. He
received the news of Al-Banna’s assassination while he was in the States. In 1952, the
Free Officers overthrew King Farouq. Qutb was one of the biggest supporters of the
Officers’ movement and it was widely believed that he had good personal relations
with the young Officers before the movement. Qutb maintained good relations with
both the Officers and the Brotherhood. Yet, Qutb’s relation with the Officers began to
deteriorate in 1953 and he decided to join the Brotherhood. Youssef Qaradawi
revealed that Qutb was close to Hudaybi, who put him in charge of the Brotherhood’s
“Nashr El-Daawa” (Propagating the call) division. Moreover, he was appointed as
Editor-in-Chief of the weekly “Ikhwan Muslemeen” magazine. In January 1954, Qutb
was among the Brotherhood leaders who were arrested. He was released in March and
issued the “Ikhwan Muslemeen” magazine, which was critical of Nasser and his Pan
Arabism policies. Qutb was arrested again after the assassination trial of Abd el
Nasser in Manshyiah and he received a 15-year prison sentence. He spent 10 years in
jail, where he wrote the cornerstone of the Jihadi literature, Milestones. He was
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released in 1964 after a meditation by the Iraqi President Abd el Salam Aref. In 1965
he was arrested again and charged of leading an armed movement aiming at
overthrowing the regime. He received a death sentence and was hanged in 1966. Qutb
was a bachelor till his death in 1966.
4.3.2. Text 2 Context:
The book was written by Sayyed Qutb while he was in jail. It was published
for the first time in 1964. The exact date of the book’s synthesis is unknown, but it is
located sometime between 1954 and 1964, while Qutb was in jail. During those years,
Brotherhood members were suffering in Nasser’s prisons, as he crushed the
movement ruthlessly. In fact, the Brotherhood members always claim they suffered
from torture and inhumane treatment during this era.
Qutb based most of his arguments on his interpretation for Quran and Sunna.
He referred mainly to medieval Islamist thinkers such as “al-Jawziyya, al-Mawdudi
and Ibn Kathir.” Practically, Qutb forged a comparison between the crisis that
believers faced in past ages and the crisis the Brotherhood suffered from. Based on
this idea, he considered it possible to relate Nasser to the apostate rulers who used to
torture Muslims.
Qutb’s Milestones was published in many versions and languages. Online
versions can easily be downloaded for free all over the Internet. According to the
Combatting Terrorism Center, Milestones was the fourth most seen book on
tawheed.ws (A Jihadist website) since its foundation till 2006 (McCants, 2006). In
terms of its structure, the book has twelve chapters, which are:
The Unique Qur’anic Generation, the Nature of the Qur’anic Method, the
Characteristics of the Islamic Society and the correct method for its formation, Jihad
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in the Cause of Allah, La Ilaha Illa Allah Methodology of the life of Islam, the
Universal Law, Islam is the Real Civilization, the Islamic Concept and Culture, A
Muslim’s Nationality and Belief, Far-Reaching Changes, the Triumphant Faith, and
this is the Road.
For the purpose of this study, the chapter titled “A Muslim’s Nationality and Belief”
will be analyzed. In the chapter, Qutb argues that Muslims must not have loyalty to
any state but the Islamist; they have to belong to it even if their friends, families or
interests are in other countries. The chapter defines the Islamist State as the state in
which Sharia law is applied and where Quran is the constitution.
4.3.3. Text 2 Analysis:
Qutb started the chapter by highlighting a statement that he previously
mentioned in the book. He confirmed that the only true system is Islam, whereas all
other systems are Jahiliyyahh. He also stated that the only law ought to be followed is
Sharia, while all the other laws were predicated upon “emotionalism and
impulsiveness.” Based on this, Qutb concluded that “a Muslim has no nationality
except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar-ulIslam. A Muslim has no relatives except those who share belief in Allah and thus a
bond is established between him and other believer through their relationship with
Allah” (Qutb, 2006, p. 133). Qutb followed this by introducing numerous examples of
believers who left their families and countries to join or build Dar-ul-Islam. Qutb
concluded by stating: “thus this partisanship - the partisanship of lineage - ended, and
this slogan - the slogan of race - died, and this pride - the pride of nationality vanished, and man’s spirit soared to higher horizons, freed from the bondage of flesh
and blood and the pride of soil and country. From that day, the Muslim’s country has
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not been a piece of land, but the homeland of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam)” (Qutb, 2006, p.
139).
Qutb continued his argument through clarification of Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ulHarb. He explicitly stated that he does not believe in the equation of ‘homeland’ with
a piece of land or in the determination of nationality by governments. He believed that
the Muslims’ homeland is Dar-ul-Islam, where the ruler is Allah, the constitution is
the Quran, and the legislations are derived from Sharia. Dar-ul-Islam doesn’t
differentiate between citizens according to their origin, race, or social level; Islam
unites them all. According to Qutb, any country where Sharia is not applied, and
where Muslims are not only fought, but also prrevented them from practicing their
religion, is Dar-ul-Harb – even if the Muslim’s family and relatives reside there
(Qutb, 2006, p. 144).
Qutb referred to Quranic verses and elements of Sunna in almost every page
of the chapter, throughout which he repeated his message several times He agreed
with Al-Banna in his approach on the necessity of restoring the Caliphate, yet he saw
it as an urgent priority. He also agreed with Al-Banna on the importance of installing
Sharia law. Yet, they seem to disagree on the issue of the constitution and tolerance
for democracy, even as a means to install Sharia. Al-Banna endorsed a gradualist
approach that seemed to be rejected by Qutb, who believed that Sharia must be
applied immediately by every Muslim as it is God’s will that must be followed. AlBanna had the luxury of political manipulation as his organizational existence was
tolerated by the regime, and so he didn’t want to threaten this very existence. This
was not the case for Qutb, whose organization lost its legal status and was banned as
its members were suffering in Nasser’s prisons. Qutb had no reason to endorse a
gradualist approach as he had almost nothing to lose. Surprisingly, his ideas were the
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reason that he forfeited a final loss: his life; Qutb’s ideas and practices were the
reason that he received a life sentence and was hanged in 1966.
4.4.Text 3: Nahda Project:
The Brotherhood announced that it is running for presidency in 2012. Their
candidate was Khairat el-Shater. When el-Shater was disqualified from running for
the presidency, Mohamed Morsi announced endorsing the Nahda – renaissance –
program and was declared the official Brotherhood candidate for presidency. The
program was not written by a single author. Many authors participated in drafting the
program and the Brotherhood didn’t announce who the writers were.
4.4.1. Text 3 Context:
After the 25th of January 2011, Egypt witnessed fair parliamentary elections late
2011. The elections’ outcome was the dominance of the Brotherhood over 43.7% of
the Egyptian Parliament seats. The following step was the presidential elections,
which was expected to be decisive for the future of Egypt. The Brotherhood, despite
previously announced it will not run for the senior position, changed its mind and
decided to run for presidency. The Brotherhood explained the decision through fear of
hijacking of the revolution, while others considered this a secret deal between SCAF
and the Brotherhood with the aim of dividing the Islamist votes. El-Sherif (2012)
refuted those arguments and confirmed that the Brotherhood’s decision to run for
presidency was earnest, although he called it “a strategic mistake”. Apparently, the
alliance between the Brotherhood and SCAF was coming to an end. The disputes over
Ganzouri’s cabinet, the constitution-drafting committee, and an expected judicial
decree to dismiss the parliament among other factors negatively affected the
relationship. The supporters of the former NDP and various secular forces expressed
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concern about this Brotherhood’s decision and explicitly announced that the
Brotherhood has an extremist agenda that contradicts the constitutional nature of the
Egyptian state. The Brotherhood’s first candidate was Khairat el-Shater, who was
disqualified from running in the elections due to legal reasons. The Brotherhood
expected the legal difficulties that el-Shater met and had a secondary candidate:
Mohamed Morsi. The Brotherhood exerted serious efforts in branding Morsi as the
representative of the Egyptian revolution, particularly in the second round when he
was running against Ahmed Shafik.
The Brotherhood members were confident about securing a significant portion of
the Islamist vote, particularly after the disqualification of their Islamist rival Abu
Ismail, leaving Abu el-Fetouh as the only qualified Islamic competitor for Morsi. The
Brotherhood’s votes and other individuals who elected Morsi yielded approximately
5,760,000 votes out of 23,672,000 who cast their votes. It was true that those votes
alone would not be able to deliver Morsi to the presidential palace. This explains why
the Brotherhood needed to introduce an appropriate discourse that can gain the
sympathy of the non-Islamist voters. Few days prior to the second round of elections,
the Brotherhood held “Fairmont Meetings,” inviting political figures in favor of “Jan
25th” to reach a consensus on the conditions of supporting Morsi. In the meetings, the
Brotherhood showed understanding for the participants’ demands and promised to
take them in consideration in exchange of the participants’ support of Morsi.
To sum up, the Brotherhood knew it won’t be possible to make it to the
presidential palace with its votes only, so they issued many reassurances for the
moderates. Among those reassurances was the Nahda program.

45

The Brotherhood’s Nahda program was disseminated in print and online. It was
distributed for free during Morsi’s presidential campaign. Seven strategic paths were
announced in the Nahda program, namely:
Building the political system. transforming into developmental economy, societal
empowerment, comprehensive human resource development, building a safety and
security system, achieving regional and international leadership, and files under focus.
The path we explore in this thesis is “building the political system.” This is why
we analyze the first two subchapters of “the political program and regime.” The
Nahda program constructs democracy in Islamist language to show that the modern
democracy pillars are compatible with Islam.
4.4.2. Text 3 analysis:
The program’s introduction states that it is based on a moderate understanding
of Sharia, and it serves to prepare society and reform its legislation in preparation for
a proper implementation of Sharia (Nahda, 2012, p. 6). The program also confirms in
the introduction that the implementation of Sharia includes all citizens.
The “political program and regime” chapter is composed of the following
three subchapters: democratic system, Islamic reference, and modern state. It starts by
clarifying that the Brotherhood will adapt a gradual conversion from the presidential
system to a semi parliamentarian system. The “democratic system” subchapter
underlines the Shoura’s role and how it has to be adapted as a principle because of
God’s orders in Quran that define it as a behavior and strategy in administrating the
state.
The program underlines the importance of the separation of powers in order to
guarantee the rule of law. The most important point that this chapter raises is that the
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people are the source of authority and that it is the state’s role to encourage pluralism
and partnership with civil society (Nahda, 2012, p. 7).
The “Islamic reference” subchapter defines the state as a constitutional
national state that is not dominated by security forces. The program also affirms that
the state must not be a theocracy, but a state ruled by elected rulers, who are
accountable to the citizens. It follows from this that the program stresses on protecting
human rights, including freedom of belief, since they were stated by Islam,. The
program confirms that the protection of freedoms will occur in light of respecting the
original religious values. It is also mentioned that the program endorses equality,
refuses discrimination, and supports and empowers women for political and societal
participation. The subchapter concludes by confirming the independence of Al-Azhar
and the Egyptian Church (Nahda, 2012, p. 8).
The Nahda program represents the most “modern” and “democratic”
document presented by the Brotherhood. It admits that citizens are the sources of
authority. It also explains the essentiality of a power separation and checks and
balances, while openly refuting theocracy. Moreover, the document asserts freedom
of belief as well as the state’s role in enhancing pluralism. However, the program
limits the scope of human rights to those approved by Islam. It uses Islamic terms like
Shoura and refers to Quranic verses and elements of Sunna.
The program may be perceived as a development in the Brotherhood’s political
thinking or as a maneuver to guarantee the required non-Islamist votes. It may also be
perceived as a step in the Brotherhood’s gradualist approach to assume power. Its
introduction, which states that “the program serves to prepare society and reform its
legislation to prepare it for a proper implementation of Sharia” may be interpreted as
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follows: this program is just a step on the way to prepare society for the
implementation of Sharia. Unfortunately, we will never be sure of the Brotherhood’s
real intention,s as Morsi was overthrown after one turbulent year in power.
4.5.Conclusion:
Reading Qutb’s Milestones alone or hearing the Brotherhood’s spokesmen
debating the Nahda program only yields misunderstandings of the Brotherhood’s
vision of the Islamist State’s institutions. Al-Banna’s messages are very important for
understanding the foundations of society. Further readings across the Brotherhood’s
history clarify Al-Banna’s messages as well as the Brotherhood’s understanding of
them. If I have to choose a main theme for the Brotherhood’s vision of the state, it
will be their gradualist approach and their readiness to maneuver in order to maintain
society and achieve its targets.
Qutb and Al-Banna were clear about their intention to install the Islamic Caliphate
to unite the entire Umma under the banner of Islam. Al-Banna seemed more patient to
achieve his goal than Qutb. Al-Banna believed in pacts, alliances, and diplomatic
tools to install the Caliphate while Qutb divided the world to Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ulHarb. The term Caliphate was not mentioned in the Nahda program, which confirmed
establishing a constitutional national state. I find no contradiction in the three
documents, as they are compatible with the Brotherhood’s objective of restoring the
Caliphate, either by Al-Banna’s diplomatic approach, Qutb’s violent approach, or
Mursi’s gradual approach.
Concerning the sources of legislation, Qutb clearly stated that refusal to comply to
god rules is an apostasy and that Sharia has to be followed. Al-Banna’s approach was
not contradicting with Qutb’s approach as he clarified that Islam is associated with its
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own legislations which came in Quran and Sunna and that those legislations have to
be followed. Among Al-Banna’s justifications was that the Egyptian constitution
states that Islam is the religion of the state. Morsi stated that applying Sharia is an
objective. Yet, Morsi showed that many reforms have to be performed as a
prerequisite of applying Sharia. Apparently, the Brotherhood believes in applying
Sharia. Yet, they may tolerate a gradual installment for the Sharia law.
The Brotherhood’s positions from democratic institutions were diverse. Qutb
refused the concept of democracy and considered it a new religion that Muslims have
to refrain from believing in. Al-Banna tolerated the concept of democracy while
refusing the separation of powers and institution of political parties. Both Qutb and
Al-Banna mentioned a possibility for violent actions if it is the only means to install
Sharia. Nahda project was issued as an electoral program in pluralistic presidential
elections. The program was issued by Freedom and Justice Party which was
recognized as the political wing of the Brotherhood. Apparently, there is a diversity in
the Brotherhood’s positions from the democratic institutions.
The spectrum between Qutb’s milestones and Morsi’s Nahda can be only
understood in the context of Al-Banna’s gradualism. Yet, it is illogical to assume a
continuous consensus among the Brotherhood over the mentioned topics. Apparently,
what gives the Brotherhood itss character is a mix between gradualism, through which
the Brotherhood maintains its structure, and the capabilities of toleration, and
adaptation which issued Morsi’s Nahda in the euphoria of the 25th of January,
delivered Qutb’s Milestones in Nasser’s jails, and maintained Al-Banna’s message as
the Brotherhood bible.
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Refused political
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institutions

parties, separation

democracy and

political parties,

of powers. Yet,

considered it a

and separation of
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religion.
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parliament.
Power usage to install

Accepted

Sharia
Table 4.1

5. The Islamist State Model of
Al-Qaeda
“There must be migration and endurance for the costs of the victory and
implementation of the religion” (Ben Laden, 2009)

“America under attack” is a news headline that won’t be forgotten for a long
time. The 11th of September attacks and their aftermath branded al-Qaeda as the
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superstar of Islamist movements in the first decade of the 21st century. Obama issued
the “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” in June 2011 in which the terms “global
terrorism” and “Qaeda” were almost used as interchangeable synonyms.
Understanding Qaeda vision for Islamist State institutions is necessary for the
purposes of this study. This chapter starts with a brief review of the history of Qaeda
since its mysterious foundation after the Afghanistan War. Qaeda foundation, Bin
Laden’s migrations, September 11 attacks, and the inter-Jihadist War between ISIS
and Qaeda are landmarks in Qaeda history that we will investigate. This will be
followed by analyzing three eye-opening documents by Qaeda’s ideologues. The first
document is Bin Laden’s speech “Declaration of Jihad against Americans Occupying
the Land of the Two Holiest Sites.” In this speech Bin Laden explains the reasons
why Qaeda considers America the enemy and why Jihad against America is the
precondition to establish the Islamist State. The second document is a video message
by Ayman al-Zawahiri in which he compares the Islamist and secular States and
highlights the differences between both. Al Zawahiri focused on Sharia and the
concept of nationality among other differences between the Islamist and secular
states. The last document is a paper written by Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, in which
he clarifies his religious position on the ISIS Caliph, and explains the conditions
required before announcing a Caliph. The chapter ends in a conclusion and summary
to deduce Qaeda’s vision of the Islamist State institutions.
5.1. Historical Background:
It is widely believed that Qaeda was founded by Osama Bin Laden in August
1988 to replace the Arabic jihadist organizations which used to fight the Soviets
during the Soviet-Afhgan war. The objective of Qaeda was expressed during its
foundation “to lift the word of God, to make his religion victorious.” During the
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foundation, Qaeda was willing to play a regional role – in Afghanistan and Pakistan –
rather than a global role (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2012). There are other narrations
regarding the foundation of Qaeda. Abdullah Azzam – Bin Laden’s mentor and a
jihadist ideologue – arguably had a crucial role in converting the Services Bureau
(Mujahideen Recruitment Bureau) to Al Qaeda, as early as 1987 (Gunaratna &
Ebrary, 2002). Another narration claims that Qaeda was not an established entity with
a clear organizational structure during this phase. Moreover, there is a claim that
Qaeda was not even called so in this phase (Burke, 2003). The name Qaeda saw the
light in the late 1980s making use of the Arab Mujahideen who fought against the
Soviets under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden, who had a regional, rather than a
global, ambition.
In 1989, Bin Laden bribed Pakistani parliamentarians to vote against Benazir
Bhutto in a no-confidence vote. When Bhutto discovered Bin Laden’s actions, she
pressured the Saudi government to return Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia. He was
therefore called to return to Saudi Arabia, where he became more interested in the
Jihad against the Arabic regimes (near enemy), particularly the South Yemeni
communist regime. Azzam, who was assassinated in 1989, opposed Jihad against
Muslim rulers who do not apply Sharia and considered Jihad for liberating Palestine,
for example, a priority. On the other hand, Zawahiri believed that Jihad against Arab
secular regimes (near enemy) is a priority and that the road to Jerusalem goes through
Cairo (Gerges, 2011). During this phase, Bin Laden and al Qaeda believed they are
eligible to announce Jihad against non-Muslim regimes. In 1991, Bin Laden returned
to Pakistan, where he faced pressures from the Pakistani government against the
Mujahdeen, who were also subjected to increasing fractionization. Bin Laden decided
to relocate his group and himself to Sudan in 1992 (Bergan & Cruickshank, 2012). In
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1992, he expressed his discontent with the American troops present in the Gulf
countries and later in Somalia. Qaeda executed attacks against the American troops in
Somalia as early as two weeks after their arrival (December 1992). The Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (EIJ) Organization – responsible for many assassination assaults against
Egyptian politicians - joined Bin Laden in Sudan under the leadership of Ayman al
Zawahiri. “Bin Laden supported EIJ to the extent that certain non-Egyptian members
of al Qaeda became envious of their treatment” (Gerges, 2011). By 1996 Qaeda’s
institutional structure was already fully set up. There is no consensus over how
tolerant the Sudanese regime was with Bin Laden regarding allowing Qaeda to have
its training camps. Yet, Bin Laden was able to maintain the presence of his
organization in Sudan with several means and coverts. They included huge business
in the field of construction that he owned, and where he almost lost all his inherited
fortune. From Sudan, Qaeda started military, political, and financial control over
several Islamist movements. Bin Laden’s relationship with the Saudi regime
deteriorated to the extent that they withdraw his Saudi nationality. Thereupon, he
described

the

Saudi

regime

as

“apostate.” In 1996, Bin Laden became completely sure that America is Islam’s
enemy and that Qaeda had to publically declare Jihad against it. Qaeda officially
prioritized the far enemy rather than the near enemy. Apparently, the Sudanese
government, which was already facing pressures to deploy Bin Laden, was not going
to tolerate such declaration. Bin Laden therefore departed from Sudan to Afghanistan
and announced his famous declaration of Jihad against America from the peaks of
Hindu Kush.
Bin Laden arrived to Afghanistan a few months before the complete domination
of Taliban over the country. Taliban-Qaeda relationships were not as ideal as many
54

perceive them to be. Gerges clarifies that the Taliban regime was neither interested in
the near nor the far enemy. It wanted to install an Islamist regime and face the internal
challenges. Most of Taliban’s senior advisors were against hosting Qaeda because it
would have engaged Taliban in unneeded tensions. The Saudi regime, for example,
used to support Taliban; the latter knew that the Saudi regime would cut those ties if it
supported Qaeda. It was Mulla Mohamed Omar – Taliban’s leader – himself who
decided to accept hosting Qaeda against the will of Taliban’s advisors (Gerges, 2011).
Omar allowed Qaeda to build their training camps all over Afghanistan. Qaeda’s
position from Saudi Arabia and the United States transformed its camps to “Mecca of
the Jihadists,” who joined the camps from all over the world, especially Saudi Arabia
and Yemen, to receive military and religious training. Taliban asked Qaeda on many
occasions to stop releasing media materials attacking Saudi Arabia and America and
not to launch attacks on foreign interests (Gerges, 2011). Apparently, Qaeda didn’t
comply with Taliban’s instructions. During Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan under
Taliban regime (1996-2001), they performed several attacks against foreign interests,
among them were the twin bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, the famous attack on the American Destroyer USS Cole, and the 9/11
attacks.
On the morning of September 11th, nineteen men hijacked four commercial
airplanes. Two planes targeted the World Trade Center in New York, another targeted
the Pentagon in Washington. The fourth plane crashed in a field near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania. It is widely believed that the fourth plane had a target as well, but the
passengers’ resistance forced the hijackers to end the trip earlier than expected. The
death toll was as catastrophic as claiming 2977 lives in the attacks. Shocked by the
attacks, America initiated the operation “Enduring Freedom” in October to deprive
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Qaeda from its safe haven in Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban regime. Taliban
lost its last strongholds and Karazi swore in as the head of power sharing government
before the end of 2001. Yet, an asymmetric war between the Jihadists and Coalition
Forces is still ongoing. Actually, operation Enduring Freedom was not limited to
Afghanistan. In fact, it extended to target Qaeda affiliates in Philippines, the African
Horn, and Saharra, among other locations. Bin Laden and Zawahiri were able to
escape the military operation and keep their lines of communication with their
affiliates active.
The years from 2001 to 2011 witnessed numerous operations by Qaeda against
Western interests. Among those operations were the 2002 Bali and Mombasa attacks,
the 2003 Riyadh Compound bombing, the 2004 Madrid Bombings, and the 2005
London Bombings. In those years, several effective Islamist groups joined Qaeda and
became their regional affiliates as well. Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen
merged in 2009 as Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP); in 2003 Al-Qaeda in
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) pledged allegiance to Qaeda; Nigerian Boko Haram,
Somalian Al-Shabab and several Afghani movements were also engaged with alQaeda’s network in those years. In May 2011, Osama Bin Laden was killed by United
States Navy Seals in the operation Neptune Spear in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The
attackers claimed to find a treasure of documents. Bin Laden’s mail was an actual
treasure to understand how Qaeda was operating. The documents clarified that Bin
Laden was deeply involved in the micro-management of the vast network, contrary to
the belief that he was an isolated ideologue (Joscelyn, 2006).
Zawahiri succeeded Bin Laden in the leadership of Qaeda. In his tenure, Qaeda
witnessed the rise of ISIS, a new ideal competitor in the Jihadist market who cut from
Qaeda’s share. Actually, Abu Mosaab Zarqawi, the founder of Islamic State in Iraq,
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was an affiliate of Qaeda and his organization used to be called Al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). Yet, in order to unite the Iraqi Jihadist movements in their fight against the
Americans, he changed the name to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in coordination with
Qaeda. The Zarqawi-Zawahiri relationship was turbulent even under Bin Laden, since
Zarqawi did not adhere to the Qaeda directives and Zawahiri considered him an
extremist (Celso, 2015). When Baghdadi became the leader of ISI, he sent Julani to
Syria, where he founded the successful Jabhet el-Nusra. Baghdadi decided to rename
his organization to Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Julani refused to comply
with Baghdadi’s state and believed he had to report to Qaeda directly. Zawahiri
supported Julani’s position against Baghdadi, who openly considered himself the
rightful Caliph of the Islamic State and assumed that every Muslim has to pay
allegiance to him. Since then, ISIS and Nusra (supported by Qaeda) were involved in
military and propaganda warfare. In 2016, Nusra changed its name to Jabhet Fath elSham, thus claiming to cut ties with other organizations. However, it is widely
believed that Nusra didn’t cut ties with Qaeda and that the rebranding was a political
maneuver.
There is a belief that Qaeda is declining under Zawahiri. Joscelyn (2016) refuted
this idea clarifying that “with Zawahiri as its emir, al Qaeda raised its “largest formal
affiliate in history” in Syria and operated its “largest training” camp ever in
Afghanistan. These two facts alone undermine the widely-held assumption that al
Qaeda is on death’s door”. Moreover, Zawahiri announced in 2014 a new affiliate for
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIM) that paid allegiance to him next to AQAP
and AQIM. Zawahiri kept the organization operating and able to threaten the interests
of the far enemy. In addition to this, Qaeda frequently releases propaganda material
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that goes viral over social media, especially the powerful messages of Ayman alZawahiri.
5.2.Text 4: Bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad:
In 1996, Bin Laden announced his famous declaration of Jihad against the
Americans occupying the land of the two holiest sites from the peaks of the Hindu
Kush Mountains in Afghanistan. But very few could predict that Bin Laden would
cause the exceptional death toll that Bin Laden’s Qaeda caused. The declaration
explains the reasons of hostility between Qaeda and the Unites States. It also reveals a
few characteristics of the Islamist State as Bin Laden perceives it in his critique for
the Saudi regime.
5.2.1. The Author:
Osama Mohamed Awad Bin Laden was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1957.
His father, Mohamed Bin Laden, “arrived in Saudi Arabia from the rugged terrain of
Northern Yemen with only what he had in his pockets, built a multi-billion-dollar
construction empire from the ground up, and established strong ties with the royal
family” (Gerges, 2011). Osama Bin Laden was the 17th of 52 sons and daughters of
the wealthy billionaire. He had a luxurious early life; he was schooled in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon, and spent many hours on his family’s ranch in the hills
and valleys between Jeddah and Mecca. Although Bin Laden showed commitment to
religious teachings since an early age, he didn’t show any interest in politics until the
late 1970s.
Bin Laden studied economics at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. During
his study, he met two lecturers who deeply influenced him: Mohamed Qutb, the
brother of the famous Jihadist ideologue Sayed Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam, a
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Palestinian scholar who became Bin Laden’s mentor during his presence in
Afghanistan in the 1980s (Gerges, 2011). Britannica tells the story of Bin Laden’s
travel to Afghanistan, that:
shortly after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, bin Laden, who viewed
the invasion as an act of aggression against Islam, began traveling to meet Afghani
resistance leaders and raise funds for the resistance. By 1984 his activities were
centered mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he collaborated with Azzam to
recruit and organize Arab volunteers to fight the Soviet occupation. Bin Laden’s
financial resources, along with his reputation for piety and for bravery in combat,
enhanced his stature as a militant leader (Britannica, Osama bin Laden, 2017).

In Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden became the militant leader who later
established al-Qaeda and led it through its ups and downs. After September 11th,
2001, Bin Laden became America’s most wanted. The American efforts to capture or
kill Bin Laden didn’t yield any outcome for 10 years, until May 2nd, 2011, when US
troops were able to locate Osama Bin Laden in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
They attacked the compound and succeeded in exterminating Osama Bin Laden.
5.2.2. Text 4 Context:
The widely distributed declaration was recorded on an audio cassette tape
spanning approximately 90 minutes in August 1996. The written version of the
declaration was widely distributed as well. It was titled “A Fatwa by Osama Bin
Laden.” The usage of cassette tapes could be inspired by the success of Khomeini in
motivating the Iranians before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 through his use of audio
tapes.
Osama Bin Laden inherited good relations with the Saudi royal family from his
father. His decisions to travel to Afghanistan and to support the resistance against the
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Soviets was in harmony with the Saudi foreign policy, which took the side of the
resistance against the Soviet forces. In the early 1990s, the Saudi regime asked for
military assistance from the United States to protect Saudi lands from a potential
invasion by Saddam Hussein’s regime after his invasion of Kuwait. The American
military presence in the Arab Peninsula outraged Osama Bin Laden, as he declared
that the Saudi regime asked for the infidels’ assistance to defend against his fellow
Muslims’ Iraqi regime. Accordingly, the relation between Bin Laden and the Saudi
regime began to deteriorate until, in 1994, the Saudi regime decided to withdraw Bin
Laden’s Saudi nationality.
Bin Laden’s position refusing the presence of American troops in the Arab
Peninsula was adopted by other Salafi scholars, among whom was Saffar el-Hawali,
whom Bin Laden cited in his speech. The years 1995 and 1996 witnessed two violent
attacks on the American Troops in Saudi Arabia in the cities of Riyadh and Khobar.
Both attacks directed a message to the American troops to withdraw from Saudi
Arabia.
This document clarifies Qaeda’s priorities for establishing the Islamist State and
explains why they consider their Jihad against the United State as an important step to
build their Islamist State. Bin Laden also criticized the Saudi regime and revealed the
reforms that it had to perform in order to be an Islamist regime.
5.2.3. Text 4 Analysis:
Bin Laden opened his speech with the traditional religious start. He followed this
by enumerating what he considered the Jewish Christian alliance’s violations against
the Muslims all over the world. He identified occupying the land of the two holy
places as the greatest aggression against Muslims. Bin Laden followed this by
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accusing the Jewish Christian alliance to be the reason behind detaining many Islamist
scholars and chasing others (Bin Laden, 1996, p. 2). He stated that he found himself a
safe haven in the Hindukush Mountains.
Bin Laden criticized the economic and social situation in Saudi Arabia, asserting
that this is the everyday talk of all Saudis. He accused the Saudi regime of
withdrawing its legitimacy by suspending the Islamic Sharia law and confronting its
Ulama, in addition to allowing Americans to occupy the land and accusing them of
destroying the Saudi economy through the latter’s heavy spending on their forces and
compliance to the oil prices they enforce (Bin Laden, 1996, p. 4). Bin Laden
mentioned that numerous attempts were made to advise the king to change his
policies. Among them was the letter of Shawwal (1991) and the glorious Memo of
Advice (1992). The Memo of Advice mentioned several topics, including the
harassment suffered by the leaders of the society, the deviation from Sharia and
arbitrary declaration of what is Halal and Haram, the state of the press and the media,
the financial and economic situation and the miserable situation of the social services,
the lack of training and preparing for the army, and supporting enemies of Islam in the
Saudi foreign policy (Bin Laden, 1996, p. 5). Bin Laden concluded this section by
asserting that the use of manmade laws instead of Sharia and the support of infidels
against Muslims are acts of apostates.
Based on the previous points, Bin Laden called upon Muslims to focus on the
main enemy (Jewish Christian Alliance) that divides the Muslim lands and recruit
agents in the region to face the Islamist reform. He assumed that the enemy faces the
Islamist reform by several means. One example is engaging them in internal conflicts
with their regimes, either through armed battles or Ulama, who release false Fatwas
supporting the agent’s regimes. Bin Laden urged Muslims to unite against the Jewish
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Christian alliance even if they have to include others to face the enemy. Those others
can even be apostates as long as they are less harmful to Muslims than the enemy is
(Bin Laden, 1996, p. 7). He warned Muslims against internal conflicts that cause
casualties among Muslims, economic losses, destroy infrastructure and fragment
society.
Bin Laden addressed the Saudi army and Security Forces, reminding them of the
Islamic history and the role of the Muslim armies in facing the enemies of Islam. He
criticized the Saudi regime for bringing “the women of the Christian armies to protect
their regime” instead of building the capacities of the Muslim army. He accused the
regime of humiliating the Saudi army and security forces by ordering them to protect
the armies of the Jewish Christian alliance. Bin Laden stated his knowledge of the fact
that the army and security forces are willing to participate in the confrontation. Yet,
he asked them not to engage in such confrontation as long as they are not ready for it.
He said that this stage requires militia, rather than organized army, operations, asking
the Muslims in the army and security forces to provide the fellow Jihadists with the
required information and materials and to keep their activities undercover, thus
confirming that the regime may forge operations against the army and accuse the
Jihadists of executing it (Bin Laden, 1996, p. 12).
Bin Laden followed this by asking Muslims generally and women in particular to
boycott the American goods in order to harm the American economy, which finances
the murder of Muslims all over the world (Bin Laden, 1996, p. 13). His following
message was to the youth, whom he considered the leaders of Jihad. He explained to
the youth that the Americans fear the Jihadists, giving the Beirut 1983 explosions as
an example. He also mentioned the withdrawal of the American forces after being
attacked in Yemen and Somalia. He considered terrifying the Americans who carry
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weapons on Muslims lands a religious obligation on Muslims, clarifying that the
peace between the Prophet and the Jews was broken when they attacked a woman,
and asserting that the enemy kills hundreds of thousands of Muslims. He finalized his
message to the youth by addressing those who fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia,
telling them that the war didn’t end and that they have to continue their Jihad (Bin
Laden, 1996, p. 19). Bin Laden’s final message to Muslims all over the world was for
them to support Jihad against the Israelis and Americans by every possible means.
Bin Laden’s message cited the Quran, Sunnah and Islamic literature to urge
Muslims to join Jihad against the Jewish Christian alliance. Bin Laden clearly
prioritized Jihad against the far enemy over the near one, clarifying that Jihad against
the near enemy would cause losses for Muslims and would not eliminate the primary
source of evil (the far enemy). Bin Laden accepted allying with others who do not
share his beliefs to fight the common enemy even if they were infidels, given that they
pose less harm than the primary enemy. He dedicated significant effort to persuading
the youth to engage in Jihad even if they are going to do that on their own and not
through his Qaeda. Generally, Bin Laden prioritized the fight against the far enemy
and was ready to ally with less harmful apostates against the Jewish Christian
alliance. His invitation to Jihad was a religious invitation rather than an one to join his
Qaeda or to build his Islamist State.
5.3.Text 5: Al-Zawahiri Message on the Differences Between the Islamist and
Secular States:
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second leader of al-Qaeda, issued the video message
Tawheed al-Kalema Hawl Kalemat al-Tawheed (unifying positions on monotheism)
after the release of the Egyptian constitution in 2012 under the Brotherhood’s
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president Morsi in which he criticized the constitution and considered it un-Islamic. In
his 103-minutes message, he clarified the differences between the Islamist and secular
states and called on the Egyptian revolution to apply Sharia and have an Islamist
State; the message was mainly directed to Egypt. Nonetheless, the video included
other messages to other regions asking all of them – including Egypt – to ignore the
fragmentations and apply Sharia.
5.3.1. The Author:
Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri was born in the prestigious
neighborhood of Maadi on the 19th of June, 1951, to a respectable middle class family
of doctors and scholars. His grandfather was the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and one of
his uncles was the first Secretary General of the Arab League. His father was a
pharmacology professor in the Cairo University Medical School. (BBC, 2015).
Al-Zawahiri was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and was
briefly arrested at the age of 15 for being a member in an outlawed organization. He
studied medicine in Cairo University and obtained his Master’s Degree in Surgery. In
1973, Zawahiri joined Islamic Jihad. In 1981, Islamic Jihad succeeded in
assassinating President Anwar el-Sadat. Hundreds of Islamic Jihad members were
tried. Al-Zawahiri was not convicted for participating in the assassination of el-Sadat
but he was convicted for possession of arms. Zawahiri was released from prison in
1985 to flee to Saudi Arabia. He left Saudi Arabia shortly to join Jihadists in
Afghanistan, where he established a faction of the Islamic Jihad movement. In 1993,
Zawahiri became the leader of Islamic Jihad and plotted several attacks on
governmental figures as a step to initiate an insurgency and announce the Islamist
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State in Egypt. Zawahiri received a death sentence in absentia in Egypt for his role in
many attacks (BBC, 2015).
In the 1990s, Zawahiri travelled all over the world searching for funding and
support for his group. He joined Bin Laden in his project and became his second in
command and Qaeda’s most prominent spokesman (BBC, 2015). Gerges clarified that
this union raised many questions, as Zawahiri spent his lifetime battling the Egyptian
regime (the near enemy) and asserted, in one of his articles in 1995, that “Jerusalem
will not be liberated unless the battle for Egypt and Algeria is won and unless Egypt is
liberated”. Apparently, most of Islamic Jihad leaders prioritized fighting the near,
rather than the far, enemy. Gerges noted that Zawahiri justified the change in his
priorities (from fighting the near enemy to fighting the far enemy) and the
transnational Jihad in his book Fursan Ttahta Rayat Al-Nabi [Knights under the
prophet’s banner]. In this book, Zawahiri called for prioritizing the fight against the
head of Kufr [infidelity]: the United States (BBC, 2015). After Bin Laden’s death,
Zawahiri became the leader of Qaeda.
5.3.2. Text 5 Context:
The video message was issued by al-Sahab Media Foundation – the official
media production house of al-Qaeda – in April, 2013. It was delivered as a speech by
al-Zawahiri including segments featuring videos for quotes or infographics. The total
duration of the video message was an hour and forty-three minutes. It doesn’t need an
expert to notice that the video was edited several times before its release. The time
when the video was recorded was a time of hope for Qaeda as Islamists were taking
over the Arab uprisings. In Egypt, President Morsi was elected and Islamist
movements were granted unprecedented freedom. In Syria, Islamist militants
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dominated the scene and achieved remarkable victories. Although the message was
broadcasted in early April 2013, it was recorded before the 8th of April, when
Baghdadi announced annexing Sham to his Islamic State in Iraq. The relation between
Qaeda and ISI started to deteriorate after Baghdadi’s announcement. The message
was recorded in a minute of optimism for Qaeda’s leader.
Zawahiri addressed various Muslim regions in his message, directing a
different message to every region. He started by asserting that Islamist efforts have to
be united and coordinated. He highlighted the “Supporting Islam Document”
(Wathiket Nasret el-Islam) that he released for the purpose of uniting the Islamists’
efforts. He asked Islamists in Syria to unite and to continue the war till they achieve
victory and warned them from the Iranians. He followed this by praising the efforts of
ISI in Iraq. His subsequent message was to the Palestinians, asking the Islamists to
unite and not to cooperate with seculars or international regimes, which he criticized.
He then addressed the Somalian people, asking them to support the Jihadists in
Somalia. His message to Muslims in Maghreb was to apply Sharia, indicating that
Tunisian politicians who were leading the country – Nahda – have nothing to do with
Islam. He highlighted the security violations against Islamists and women in the Arab
Peninsula parsing AQAP efforts. Zawahiri asked Pakistanis to join the Islamist State
in Afghanistan after directing harsh criticism to the Pakistani politicians. The previous
messages spanned fifty minutes of footage. The remaining fifty-three minutes were
dedicated to Zawahiri’s message to Egypt, in which he discussed the compatibility of
the institutional settings of the Egyptian state (according to the constitution of 2012)
with his vision for the Islamist State. Zawahiri’s message to Egypt clarifies his – and
Qaeda’s – vision for the institutions of the Islamist State. For the purposes of this
study, Zawahiri’s message to Egypt will be the subject of our analysis.
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5.3.3. Text 5 Analysis:
Al-Zawahiri divided his message to Egypt into two section: in the first section
he answered the question whether or not a real transformation was achieved in Egypt,
while the second section describes a road map for achieving such transformation. He
provided a negative answer to the first question, after which he mentioned three
aspects for the required transformation: applying Sharia, gaining independence from
foreign interference, and ending corruption. Zawahiri spent most of his message
clarifying that Sharia was not applied in Egypt and that the current constitution does
not reflect that of an Islamist State.
Al-Zawahiri graphically presented a comparison between the Islamist and the
national secular state. Three main differences introduced by al-Zawahiri were the
sources of legislations, equality between citizens, and the responsibility over other
Muslims states (Zawahiri, Unifying the positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 1).
Al-Zawahiri asserted that the Islamist State’s legislations must come from
Sharia and that Shoura has to be followed by the rulers. Considering the citizens or
the majority of voters the source of legislation according to Zawahiri is non-Islamic
but rather an aspect of the national secular state. He criticized several articles in the
2012 constitution, claiming that they confirm the parliament’s rights to legislate and
suggest amendments to the constitution. He undermined the articles which stated that
Sharia is the primary source of legislation, a statement that indicates the existence of
other sources of legislation that might potentially introduce laws incompatible with
Sharia (Zawahiri, Unifying the positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 4). Al-Zawahiri
clarified that citizens must not be allowed to legislate, and that instead they have to
comply with God’s Sharia. However, al-Zawahiri stated that rulers must be chosen
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according to Shoura, taking in consideration the religious conditions – among which
that the ruler must be a Muslim male. He added that the ruler may be accounted or
even impeached but again, in accordance with the Islamic regulations (Zawahiri,
Unifying the positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 4).
The second difference between the Islamist and national secular state,
according to al-Zawahiri, is that the Islamist State treats all Muslims equally without
consideration of their place of birth or residency; on the other hand, the national
secular state is assumed to treat citizens equally, regardless of their religious
affiliation. Al-Zawahiri criticized this, confirming that a Sudanese Muslim is more
eligible to be a judge in Egypt than a Christian Egyptian. Al-Zawahiri also criticized
the Egyptian constitution for making it possible for Christians or atheists to run for
presidency (Zawahiri, Unifying the positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 7) and for
stating that citizens are equal in their rights and obligations. The Islamist State
according to Qaeda perceives all Muslims equally and gives them the same rights and
obligations. Those rights and obligations are not granted for non-Muslims even if they
were born and raised in the Islamist State.
The responsibility of the Islamist State over Muslims elsewhere was the third
difference according to al-Zawahiri’s account. Al-Zawahiri believes that the Islamist
State is responsible for Muslims everywhere. In case Muslims were attacked
anywhere, it is the responsibility of the Islamist State to defend them (Zawahiri,
Unifying the positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 3). Qaeda perceives this as a
religious obligation that has nothing to do with pacts, agreements or interests. He
criticized the political borders between Muslim countries, concluding that those are
Sykes and Picot borders that were placed by the West to weaken Muslims. The video
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message included a segment for the Rafah families who were divided between the
Egyptian and Palestinian Rafah.
The second and third aspects of the transformation were discussed by alZawahiri. He confirms that Egypt still complies with America and Israel, proving this
by underlining the Brotherhood’s pledge to respect the international agreements that
Egypt signed. He considered the Camp David agreement, the continuation of facility
provision for the American troops, and the siege on Gaza as clear indicators of the
Egyptian compliance with the West (Zawahiri, Unifying the positions on the
monotheism, 2013, p. 9). Corruption was the third aspect of the failed transformation.
Al-Zawahiri highlighted the corruption in police stations as well as the fact that
corrupted police officers were not introduced to trials and that the social conditions of
Egyptians are still humble and poor. Generally, al-Zawahiri believed that no
transformation occurred in Egypt.
Zawahiri believed that a road map is required to accomplish the
transformation aspired. The first step would be to state clearly that Sharia is the only
source of legislation and to have this statement as an supra-constitutional principle
that cannot be amended by any means. This has to be followed by revising the current
legislations and amending them to comply with Sharia (Zawahiri, Unifying the
positions on the monotheism, 2013, p. 8). Zawahiri stated that the compliance to the
West must stop and Egypt has to make its own decisions. Finally, Zawahiri believed
that the Egyptian government has to seriously fight corruption and end the social
injustices prevailing all over Egypt.
Zawahiri gave his speech in Arabic Fusha using expression from the Jihadist
literature. His discourse was logical rather than heavily dependent on citations from
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the Quran or Sunna. Sahab’s choices for the graphic materials were in the context of
Zawahiri’s speech. Zawahiri was clear that an Islamist State has to comply to Sharia
even if it contradicts the voters’ will. He tolerated a form of democracy in the choice
of rulers and in holding them accountable. The Islamist State, from Zawahiri’s
perspective, believes in equality among Muslims and not citizens. The state is obliged
to protect Muslim societies all over the globe. He also stated that the Islamic State
must be free from Western influence and must work to fight corruption and achieve
social justice.
5.4. Text 6: Shinqiti’s Fatwa on the Caliph of the Islamic State:
The Jihadist civil war between Nusra – supported by Qaeda – and ISIS motivated
the Islamist scholars on both sides to issue Fatwas clarifying their positions from the
dispute, indicating their vision for the Islamist State institutions, and criticizing the
other side for deviating from this vision around the Islamist State institutions. Abu
Mundhir al-Shinqiti issued a fatwa in 2014 to clarify why he does not consider ISIS’s
Caliph legitimate. Shinqiti’s – and Qaeda’s –

main religious argument was the

presence of another previously installed legitimate Caliph. Shinqiti’s fatwa shed light
on Qaeda’s conditions for announcing a Caliph.
5.4.1. The Author:
Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti is a Mauritanian scholar whose real identity is unknown.
In 2009, He cofounded the Sharia Council that gave fatwas to questioners from all
over the world on the website (www.tawhed.ws/FAQ) with al-Maqdisi, Hani al-Sibai,
and Turki al-Bin Ali among others (Wagemakers, 2016). Shinqiti issued many fatwas
that went viral in the Jihadist community. Among them was his fatwa for the Egyptian
Muslims to fight the army in Sinai, in addition to one targeting Christians in Muslim
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lands in general and Egypt in particular, as well as another fatwa to encourage
stealing from the French and hacking American markets to steal from them (alShinqiti, nd).
Al-Shinqiti was engaged in many debates, especially on the Syrian civil war.
Shinqiti criticized scholars who allowed Muslims to join the Free Army as he
perceived it as a secular organization. He urged Muslims in Syria to join the Nusra
Front instead of creating new movements. He initially praised ISI and welcomed the
merge between ISI and Nusra. His position radically changed after ISIS’s
announcement of the Caliph (Wagemakers, 2016). He criticized ISIS and supported
Qaeda’s position. Moreover, al-Shinqiti wrote an article in 2015 titled “Al-Shaykh
Ayman el-Zawahiri… Ragolan Beomma”. He addressed Zawahiri stating, “saying I
love you doesn’t express how I love you” (Al-Shinqiti, 2015)
5.4.2. Text 6 Context:
The Inter-Jihadist conflicts are common among scholars. The dispute between
ISIS and Nusra was associated with various fatwas and opinions written by scholars
from both sides. Two main topics represent the essence of the disagreement between
the two groups: the excessive use of violence by ISIS, and the legitimacy of its
Caliph. The fatwa discussed is in the context of questioning the legitimacy of ISIS’s
Caliph.
The fatwa was issued by al-Shinqiti on the 15th of July, 2014. It was issued
online on the website (www.tawhed.ws) and went viral on the Jihadist social media.
The fatwa was issued two weeks after Adnani’s announcement that the Islamic State
in Iraq and Sham is to be renamed “the Islamic State.” Before Adnani’s
announcement, al-Shinqiti was a big supporter of ISIS (Wagemakers, 2016). He
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supported Baghdadi’s decision to annex Sham to the Islamic State in Iraq in April
2013, and considered it legitimate as Baghdadi had sent Nusra’s leader al-Jawlani to
Syria and supported him in the first place (Wagemakers, 2016). When Adnani
announced renaming ISIS to IS, he was practically dropping the territorial aspect of
his state and rebranding it to be the only legitimate Caliphate. Adnani asked Muslims
from all over the world to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Al-Shinqiti disagreed
with this call as he believed in the presence of a Caliph who was previously chosen by
Muslim scholars. This Caliph is Mullah Mohamed Omar, the leader of Taliban. AlShinqiti’s position was similar to that of the founder of Sharia Council, al-Maqdisi,
who also criticized ISIS after engaging in reconciliation attempts with Nusra. A
younger cofounder of the Sharia Council, Turki al-Bin Ali, took ISIS’s side and
became one of its most prominent spokesmen and ideologues. He issued several texts
to refute his former colleagues’ criticism.
This fatwa is studied as it clarifies some of the religious conditions of
establishing a Caliphate from Qaeda’s perspective. Although al-Shinqiti asserts that
his fatwa comes from his religious conviction and it doesn’t imply any political
affiliation, it is quite revealing of the Qaeda leaders’ vision for the institutions of the
Islamist State.
5.4.3. Text 6 analysis:
Shinqiti started his fatwa by asserting that this is a religious fatwa that is
totally unaffected by political affiliations (Shinqiti, 2014, p. 1). He followed this by
proving that from a religious point of view, there is no difference between what he
calls the Emara and the Caliphate, pointing out that there has been a legitimate
operating Islamic Caliphate since the foundation of the Islamic regime in Afghanistan.
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He clarified that a legitimate Islamic Caliphate is installed as soon a Muslim man
receives Bayaa –

pledge of allegiance – even if he doesn’t have the required

influence over the Muslim territories, as long as his Bayaa is not preceded by another
Bayaa to another man (Shinqiti, 2014, p. 2). He considered the Caliph’s influence
over Muslim lands a political requirement for the Caliphate, but not a condition from
a religious perspective. Accordingly, Shinqiti believes that a man can be a legitimate
Caliph if he received Bayaa even if he was not practicing influence over Muslim
territories, as long as no other man received a previous Bayaa. This means that Mullah
Mohamed Omar, having received the first Bayaa, is the legitimate Caliph (Shinqiti,
2014, p. 4).
Shinqiti showed that it is eligible to give a Bayaa to a territorial Emir who
becomes an acting Caliph over certain territories if the unification of Muslims over
one Caliph is impossible. As soon as the unification is possible, the legitimate Caliph
is the first Emir who received Bayaa whatever his title was, even if he didn’t ask for
his right. Shinqiti derived many proofs for his opinion from Sunna. Accordingly,
Shinqiti said that this leaves Muslims with two options: either to assume that the
unification is impossible and accordingly give Bayaa to local Emirs, or to agree to be
united under one Caliph who would govern Muslims all over the world. According to
Shinqiti, the rightful Caliph who shall unite Mulims – if they see the unification
possible – is Mullah Mohamed Omar, as he is the first Emir who received the Bayaa
even if he was not able to practice his influence (Shinqiti, 2014, p. 7).
Shinqiti also addressed the claim that Omar is not a rightful Caliph as he
doesn’t have Qurayshi roots. He started by highlighting that the Qureshi roots
condition for the Caliph is a matter of debate among scholars. Then, he clarified that
Taliban didn’t have a candidate who met the Qurashi roots conditions. So, they chose
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the most fitting candidate who was Omar. Accordingly, he became the rightful Caliph
as he received the Bayaa.
Shinqiti’s final words summarized four religious mistakes that ISIS fell into
when they announced their Islamist State: giving Bayaa to Baghdadi who had
previously given Bayaa to Zawahiri, announcing a Caliph from their group in the
midst of a dispute with other Islamist faction, ignoring the presence of a rightful
previous Caliphate, and asking Muslims to cancel their previous Bayaa. Shinqiti
warned against the concept of cancelling Bayaas, clarifying that this will undermine
the Bayaa and encourage disobedience (Shinqiti, 2014, p. 9).
Shinqiti confirmed in every possible chance that his fatwa comes from his
religious convictions and that it does not imply any political objectives to support one
side over the other. He used logical evidence in addition to citations from Sunna to
prove his point of view. He used a soft language is his criticism for ISIS, while using
strong phrases to express his religious point of view.
Generally, Shinqiti’s text draws our attention to the fact that Qaeda accepts
giving the Bayaa to a non-empowered Caliph as long as there is no other Caliph who
received the Bayaa. They don’t mind giving the Bayaa to a Caliph who is not from
their organizational ranks. However, he has to be believing in their ideas. They agree
to ignore the Qurayshi roots condition in necessity. Finally, Qaeda refuses the
cancelation of Bayaa and considers it a threat for the Caliphate.
5.5.Conclusion:
The analyzed texts from Qaeda seemed consistent with each other. Zawahiri’s text
was chosen to shed light on Qaeda’s vision of the Islamist State institutions generally
with special focus on the Sharia and legislation. Yet, it highlighted Qaeda’s refusal for
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the American influence which was the main topic of Bin Laden’s speech that clarified
Qaeda’s priority of fighting the far enemy. Bin Laden’s speech showed that Qaeda’s
priority is not holding power but fighting the far enemy. This was proved by the third
text, which revealed that Qaeda pledged allegiance to Mullah Mohamed Omar and
kept this Bayaa. Generally, there were no contradictions between the three texts that
seemed consistent with each other.
Shinqiti showed that the Caliphate is installed as soon as an Emir receives a
Bayaa. He also showed a possibility to tolerate multiple Emirs in case the unification
of Muslims over one Emir is impossible. Zawahiri highlighted a global aspect for the
Islamist State as it is obliged to protect Muslims generally and not only Muslims
within its borders. Moreover, Zawahiri believed in equality between all Muslims
regardless to their places of birth. Yet he didn’t refuse the concept of multiple Emirs.
Promptly installing Sharia was a clear objective for Qaeda in the three texts.
Zawahiri believed that Sharia must be the source of legislation whether people
accepted it or not, and refused the idea of considering the people the source of
legislation. Moreover, he refused any other sources of legislation other than Sharia;
Zawahiri considered Sharia the only source of legislation. Bin Laden criticized the
Saudi regime for not applying Sharia and refused the presence of manmade
legislations in Saudi Arabia.
Concerning the democratic institutions and the use of power to install Sharia,
Zawahiri was clear that the Muslim ruler who installs Sharia may be elected,
accounted, or impeached, according to the Islamic regulations. Shinqiti refused the
concept of the withdrawal of Bayaa from a Muslim ruler and considered it a threat for
the Islamist State. Yet he accepted the concept that the Muslim ruler may willingly
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forfeit power. Bin Laden highlighted the concept of advising the ruler. Despite Bin
Laden’s criticism of the Saudi regime, he didn’t welcome using violence against it as
he considered this usage of power harmful to Muslims and prioritized using power
against foreign enemies.
Qaeda’s ideas are clear and consistent in the priorities, including social justice and
fighting corruption. They were ready to get in tactical alliances to achieve their goals.
Yet, they do not consider the application of Sharia a negotiable matter.

Summary:
Qaeda
Caliphate

Tolerate territorial Emirs if unification of Muslims on one
Emir is impossible.

Sharia

The only source of legislation and has to be applied
promptly.

Democratic

Ruler maybe elected and accounted but the impeachment

institutions

have to take place only if he violates Sharia.

Power usage to install

The priority is to use the power against the far enemy who

Sharia

supports his agents.
Table 5.1
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6. The Islamist State Model for
The Islamic State –IS“The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by
Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dābiq.” (Zarqawi, 2004)

The Islamic State (IS) is the most updated version of the group that started to
operate in Iraq in October 2004 and used to be called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The
group name changed several time indicating political developments. The same group
used to be called Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS).
Sham in Arabic language is the Levant. This is why an alternative name for ISIS is
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The group is currently led by Abu Bakr el
Baghdady who is recognized by the group as the legitimate Caliph of the Muslims all
over the globe.
The group issued several infographics and videos describing the operating Islamist
State institutions that they installed in the territories under their control. As explained
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in the introduction, this thesis is not willing to deduce the Islamist movements’ vision
for the Islamist State through the movements’ empirical experiences. It is analyzing
the movements’ theoretical assumptions on the state to deduce the movements’ vision
for the Islamist State. Accordingly, this chapter starts with shedding the light on the
history of IS since its foundation as AQI till 2016. This is followed by analyzing a
speech and two articles: the speech is by Abu Mohamed el Adnani in which he
announced changing the name of ISIS to IS; The first article comes from IS’s official
English speaking magazine, Dabiq. It describes the required steps to achieve the
Caliphate from IS’s point of view. The second article comes from Dabiq too. It
criticizes the Brotherhood and accuses them of being apostates. Going through the
three documents clarifies to us IS’s vision for the institutions of the ideal Islamist
State.
6.1. Historical Background:
On the the 19th of February, 2003, President Bush announced that the United
States, and the International Coalition had begun the military operation “Iraqi
Freedom” against Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. By the 9th of April the Coalition
forces controlled Baghdad and Saddam’s statue in the Firdos Square was toppled
down. Bush declared on the first of May in the same year “major combat operations”
over. Not long after this date, the Iraqi insurgency against the occupation emerged and
developed. The insurgency united former regime loyalists, nationalists, tribal
elements, Sunni Islamists and foreign fighters. “in June 2004, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri,
the Iraqi vice president and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council before the
war, along with his two sons, met Zarqawi at which they pledged their support for his
guerrilla efforts. The atmosphere of the meeting was full of enthusiasm, as Ibrahim al
Douri announced to al-Zarqawi, ‘You are the commander and we are your soldiers”
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(Michael, 2007). Zarqawi led many successful operations against foreign interests
and utilized the internet effectively for publicizing his activities. For example, In May
2004, a video was broadcasted online for the beheading of the young American
businessman Nicholas Berg. Zarqawi was sending a message to dissuade the west
from sending troops or aiding in Iraq’s reconstructions. In October 2004 Zarqawi
pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and Qaeda. Bin Laden responded to Zarqawi Bayaa
by welcoming him and designated him as the leader of al-Qaeda in the ‘Land of the
Two Rivers’.
Al Qaeda Central (AQC) and AQI had a major disagreement on targeting Shia
in Iraq. Bin Laden believed that a united Islamic front has to be fostered to face the
Coalition forces. Zarqawi perceived Shia as apostates and thought that allying with
them would discourage foreign Sunni fighters from Joining AQI (Michael, 2007). In
early 2006, Zarqawi brought together several Iraqi movements in Majlis Shoura alMujahdin (MSM). MSM was led to a great extent by AQI (Zelin, 2014). On the 7th of
June, 2006 the American Special Forces succeed in tracking down Zarqawi and
killing him (Michael, 2007).
On October 15th, MSM released a statement announcing establishing the
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). On November 10th, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, Zarqawi’s
successor in AQI pledged Bayaa to the leader of ISI, Abu Omar al Baghdadi (Zelin,
2014). Zelin assumes that al Muhajer pledged allegiance to Abu Omar al Baghdadi
only and didn’t pledge allegiance to Bin Laden. Hence, “Zarqawi’s death invalidated
MSM’s implied pledge to bin Ladin. This means that, in effect, the group and its
subsequent incarnations have not technically been subordinate to al-Qaeda” (Zelin,
2014).
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“The Islamic State pursued a dual strategy of fighting the Iraqi government
and American forces, on one hand, and rival insurgent factions on the other” (NoName, 2014). ISI orchestrated several bloody attacks in Iraq. Among them: The series
of truck bombs in Yazidi towns in 2007; the dual suicide bomb attacks in Baghdad
and Diyala and the coordinated attacks in Baghdad in 2009. ISI’s targets included:
Shia, Christians, Jews, Sufis and Muslims who join the political process. The Iraqi
Security Forces, Sahawat –Sunni Militias supported by the Americans-, and the
Americans were able to lead a successful –to a great extent- campaign against ISI
between 2007 and 2010. On the 18th of April, 2010 Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu
Hamza al Muhajer –ISI’s War Minister- were killed by the Americans. Abu Bakhr al
Baghdadi succeeded Abu Omar al Baghdadi in leading ISI. In 2010, a string of
suicide bomb attacks hit Iraqi cities from Mosul to Basra in Ramadan. Baghdadi
asserted that the attacks were for the sake of the blessed prisoners. In October 2010,
ISI attacked Christian worshippers in Baghdad and justified it by events related to
Christians’ acts in Egypt (No-Name, 2014).
ISI’s attacks continued in 2011, but the complete American military departure
in December 2011 marked a cornerstone in ISI operations. In January 2012, ISI
initiated a large scale attacks against Shia civilians. In July 2012, Al Baghdadi
Announced “an extended campaign to free all Jihadist prisoners and capture territory”
(No-Name, 2014). From July 2012 to July 2013, ISI launched 8 campaigns against
Iraqi prisons and freed hundreds of prisoners. In July 2013, ISIS announced that their
new campaign “Soldiers Harvest” is targeting ISF especially in areas with Sunni
majority. ISIS’s new campaign succeeded in December 2013 in entrapping and killing
the leadership of the ISF’s 7th division, and in January 2014, ISIS took over the Iraqi
city of Fallujah. (No-Name, 2014)
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Nusra Front is an Islamist Jihadist group that started to operate in Syria in
2011 after an uprising that has taken place in Syria and loosen the Syrian Security
grip over vast Syrian territories. Nusra Front’s leader Abu Mohamed al Julani was
sent and supported by ISI for Jihad in Syria. ISI considered Nusra to be a subordinate
to it as Julani was a member of ISI and he was supported by it. In April, 2013
Baghdadi announced annexing Nusra to his movement and renamed his movement to
“Islamic State in Iraq and Sham” (ISIS). “In fact, the leaders of al-Nusra claimed to
never have agreed to this decision, and the new leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman alZawahiri, intervened: Zawahiri reaffirmed al-Nusra's independence and ordered ISIL
to leave Syria. But Baghdadi defied the command, stating that after consulting his
council” (Shafer-Ray, 2015). The disagreement over Nusra’s position from ISIS was a
major reason for ISIS-Qaeda dispute. It led Zawahiri to take a decision to disaffiliate
ISIS in February, 2014. Baghdadi asked Nusra members to quit Julani and give Bayaa
to him and went in an armed battle with Nusra.
In June, 2014 ISIS launched its operation to control Mosul. The city fell in the
hands of ISIS in less than a week. ISIS looted caches of weapons and equipment from
their new capital. The victors displaced around 500,000 citizens (No-Name, 2014).
On the 12th of June, ISIS controlled Camp Speicher in Tikrit. They singled out Shia
and non-Muslims from Sunnis and murdered more than 1100 unarmed Shia Iraq Air
Force cadets. Tikrit and the oil refinery in Baji fell also in the hands of ISIS who
followed this by moving towards Baghdad when Iranian supported militias prevented
them from controlling the strategic city of Samarra and continuing the march. By the
end of June, ISIS announced changing their name to the Islamic State –IS- and
pledged allegiance to their leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as the Caliph of Muslims all
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over the globe. Few days later, al Baghdadi gave his famous speech from the Big
Mosque in Mosul.
In August, 2014, the American President Obama authorized airstrikes
targeting IS in Iraq and Syria. The first airstrikes came in a reaction towards the ethnic
cleansing ISIS started against the Yazidi minority in Sinjar. The drones supported the
Kurdish fighters in their ground battles against IS to free Yazidi areas. This was
developed by time to be a strategy which supports friendly ground units engaging in
battles against IS. The campaign was a component of Obama’s strategy to “degrade
and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State. IS responded to US and Coalition airstrikes
by beheading foreigners including journalists and aid workers.
By early 2015, IS was controlling vast areas from the outskirts of Aleppo in
Syria to down and central Iraq including major cities such as Mosul and Raqqa and
various other cities. Various Islamist provinces outside Syria and Iraq pledged
allegiance to IS and renamed themselves to the “Islamic State”. In 2014, Ansar Bait al
Maqdis renamed themselves to the Islamic State in Sinai; Militants in Libya and
Nigeria and other territories pledged allegiance to Baghdadi.
ISIS online propaganda and activities succeeded in recruiting many Islamists
who performed lone wolves’ operations. Several operations were executed against
civilians outside Syria and Iraq. Among them: Paris attacks; Russian jet attack;
Tunisia beach attack, and numerous other attacks. IS are very active in their online
propaganda activities, and they maintain issuing periodic magazines in Arabic –such
as Al Nabaa – and in English –such as Dabiq- and in other languages –such as
Rumiyah-. ISIS’s periodicals contains news, articles and high quality infographics and
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images. ISIS produces videos and images frequently to shed the light on their
activities and to recruit new members.
In 2016, IS witnessed several defeats in Iraq and Syria. The coalition
supported militias in Syria to fight IS and assisted them with the airstrikes. Iraq
security forces coordinated with several foreign powers to contain IS’s activities in
Iraq. IS’s success stories in 2016 were mainly in recruiting lone wolves out of Syria
and Iraq to perform attacks against the west and in few of their provinces outside
Syria and Iraq.
6.2. Text 7: Adnani’s speech announcing IS:
By the end of June 2014, ISIS was controlling vast territories in Iraq and Syria,
and their relation with Qaeda was deteriorating. Abu Mohamed al Adnani issued his
speech to announce that ISIS is not a territorial Emirate with a limited influence
anymore. He declared that his Emirate is now the Islamic State whose influence isn’t
recognizing boarders and declared that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi has become the Caliph
of Muslims. Adnani asked Muslims all over the world to pledge allegiance to Abu
Bakr al Baghdadi. In his historical speech, Adnani clarified the essentiality of having
a Caliphate from IS’s point of view and shed a light on the criteria of choosing the
Caliph.

6.2.1. The Author:
Taha Sobhi Falaha –Known by his alias Abu Mohamed al Adnani- was born
in 1977 in Idlib, Syria. According to a Targama [biography] issued by Turki al Bin
Ali for al Adnani in 2014, Adnani was described as the “Catapult of the Islamic
State”. He was raised loving the mosques and memorized the Quran in less than a
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year. He mentioned three Sheikhs as the most influential sheikhs in his life “Abu
Anas al Shami, Abu Maysra al Gharib and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi”. Adnani wrote
several books and gave numerous lessons on Islamism along his life. Bin Ali added
that al Adnani pledged allegiance to al Zarqawi in the early 2000s with 35 other
Syrians to fight the Syrian regime but, after the occupation of Iraq, he moved to fight
in Iraq (Bin Ali, 2014).
According to Bin Ali, al Adnani was detained by the Syrian regime three times
and by the Americans in Iraq two times. His longest detention lasted for almost six
years in Iraq. Al Adnani held many senior positions in IS since his release in 2010. He
was the Spokesman of ISI, ISIS and IS. (Bin Ali, 2014). Counter Extremism Project
clarifies that Adnani was also ISIS’s Emir in Syria since the splitting between ISIS
and Nusra. Adnani was also believed to to head Emni unit in IS which “has become a
combination of an internal police force and an external operations branch, dedicated
to exporting terror abroad” (CALLIMACHI, 2016). Adnani was believed to be IS’s
second in charge after Baghdadi.
Al Adnani addressed two calls for IS sympathizers in the West to carry out
attacks targeting civilians and military personnel in their countries in September 2014,
and May 2016. In May 2015, a reward up to US$ five million was announced for
information leading to his capture. On the 30th of August, 2016 al Adnani was killed
by an airstrike. The Russians claimed that they performed the airstrike which led to
kill al Adnani in Aleppo while the Americans claimed that they had executed the
operation in al Bab city near to the Syrian Turkish boarders.
6.2.2. Text 7 Context:
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Adnani’s speech was broadcasted on the Jihadist social media on the 29th of
June, 2014, the first day of Ramadan in the Hijri year 1435. Ramadan is considered a
holy month by Muslims, and during the month before Ramadan, ISIS achieved
unprecedented achievements as it was officially controlling huge territories across
Syria and Iraq. Their victory in controlling Mosul in June, 2014 raised the attention of
most of the spectators. The spectators were not only the global powers who were
assessing the situation to decide if they have to interfere but also the jihadists from all
over the globe who found a successful model who is able to seize territories and
achieve military success and challenge both the far and near enemy in the Iraqi
battlefield.
The Syrian context may also assist us to understand the motives which
encouraged ISIS to alter to IS. In 2014, there were several Islamist movements who
are fighting the Syrian regime and each other in a chaotic scene over influence and
territories in Syria. Announcing a legitimate Caliphate was assumed to encourage the
movements’ members to leave their movements and join the legitimate Caliphate.
Uniting the Islamist movements in Syria and ending the inter-rebel disputes would
have given those movements a better position in their fight in Syria.
The speech was broadcasted as an approximately forty minutes’ audio speech.
A video was issued before the audio speech featuring ISIS members on the SyrianIraqi boarders. Abu Omar al Shishani –ISIS War Minister- and other Jihadists from
several nationalities were around al Adnani when he announced that ISIS is not
recognizing the boarders anymore. In the speech, Adnani used Quran, Sunna and
Islamic heritage to motivate Islamists to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
and join the Islamist State.
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6.2.3. Text 7 Analysis:
Adnani started without the expected Islamic commencement, probably to
highlight the importance of the content of his speech. Adnani followed this by
asserting that god promised Muslims to empower and secure them in case they stick
to the monotheism and get away from any sign of Shirk [polytheism]. Adnani
continued by asserting that Muslims have to comply to god’s orders in order to
achieve god’s promise of empowerment. Accordingly, Muslims have to use every
possible mean to enforce Sharia as installing the religion and enforcing Sharia is the
reason that god sent his messengers for (Adnani, 2014, p. 1).
Adnani gave example by how inferior were Arabs before Mohamed and how
did Islam changed this by uniting them and made them able to defeat the world’s
largest empires in their time. Accordingly, Adnani confirmed that if Muslims were
back to Islam in its purist form, god will bless them again with the victory and the
empowerment. He considered that ISIS’s victory in controlling the territories from
Aleppo to Diyala a sign for the coming victory. Adnani mentioned few of what he
perceived as obligations on an Islamic State. Among those obligations were: Applying
the whole Sharia laws through Islamic courts; protecting the frontlines; demolishing
crosses and graves (visited by Shia and Sufis); collecting Fayaa, Jizyah (non-Muslims
taxes), Khuraj and Zakat (obligatory alms); Removing Munkar (What is refused in
Islam); and organizing Islamic lessons (Adnani, 2014, p. 5). Adnani added that there
is an additional religion obligation that Muslims must install in order to submit to god
will to feel the pride of being a Muslim, appointing a Caliph. Accordingly, Adnani
announced that “Ahlu al Hal we al Akd” –decision makers- decided to appoint Abu
Bakr al Baghdadi as the Caliph of Muslims. In Adnani’s introduction for al Baghdadi,
he focused that Baghdadi’s roots are coming from Quaich tribe (Adnani, 2014, p. 6).
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Adnani added that by the announcement of the Caliph, every Muslim has to
pledge allegiance to al Baghdadi, and every other Islamist movement is illegitimate.
He described Democracy, secularism and nationalism as the trash of the west that
Muslims have to abandon in order to restore their religion and to control the East and
the West and to fulfill god’s promise of empowerment. He followed this by
addressing the leaders of the Islamist movements and armies asserting that he can’t
find a legitimate excuse for them to restrain from supporting the Islamic State
encouraging them to end the fragmentation and division which is against the religion
and join the Islamic State confirming that those movements won’t be able to stand
against the Islamic State (Adnani, 2014, p. 8).
Adnani then refuted two claims against the state: the first is that, it is a state of
Khawarij. This was refuted as the state proved not to be so in the cities governed by
ISIS; The second claim was that the infidels won’t tolerate the presence of the Islamic
State. Adnani refuted this by confirming the continuous victories of ISIS. Adnani’s
pre-final message was to the soldiers of ISIS. He warned them from expected
challenges that they have to prove loyalty to their Emirs in order to overcome. He
encouraged them to keep united and loyal to their Emirs. He added to this that if
someone tried to divide the group, then he must be killed (Adnani, 2014, p. 11).
Adnani followed this by clarifying that the groups, movements and armies has never
been unified over a decision and their disagreement is not a reason not to appoint the
Caliph. He Stated that despite this, the Islamist movements have to comply to the
appointment of the Caliph (Adnani, 2014, p. 12). Adnani finalized his message by
congratulating the Muslims for Ramadan and praying god that Muslims were
empowered in Ramadan.
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Adnani’s message clarified that IS believe that appointing a Caliph is a
religious obligation that must be fulfilled upon the agreement of Ahl al Hal we al Akd
even if some Islamist movements and groups were not agreeing on the nominee. They
see that the Islamist State has to install the Sharia, demolish crisis and graves and
enforce Jizyah and Islamic obligatory alms. They believe that Muslims are allowed to
use violence to install the Caliph and apply Sharia not only against infidels and
apostates but even against rival Islamist movements who are threatening the Islamist
unity under the Caliph.
6.3. Text 8&9: Dabiq’s Articles:
Dabiq is IS’s official English speaking periodical. It is printed in a very high
quality with plenty of pictures and infographics. Dabiq is assumed to be a recruiting
tool for IS in the west as they issue their ideas on the World Wide Web through it.
Clarion project had been following Dabiq since its first issue. It introduces it saying
“Dabiq as it is called, bills itself as “a periodical magazine focusing on the issues
of tawhid (unity), manhaj (truth-seeking), hijrah (migration), jihad (holy

war)

and jama’ah (community). It will also contain photo reports, current events, and
informative articles on matters relating to the Islamic State. It portrays the Islamic
State as they see themselves: boasting of their victories and painting a romantic image
of the restoration of an Islamic golden age and the heralding of a “glorious” new
caliphate based on holy war. Dabiq is a place in Syria that is supposed to be the
location for one of the final battles according to certain Muslim myths about a final
apocalypse. Choosing such a name for the magazine highlights the caliphate’s goals”
(Harris, 2014).
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Dabiq first issue was released in Ramadan 2014 few days after announcing the
Caliphate, and its title was “The Return of Khalifah”. Dabiq’s last issue was the 15th
issue. It was then replaced with a new periodical “Rumiyah”. Both periodicals are
recognized as official periodicals representing the positions of IS. For the purpose of
answering the research question of this thesis, two articles are analyzed: The first
article was released in the first issue of Dabiq “From Hijra to Khilafah”, it explains
the steps required to achieve the rightful Khilafah from IS point of view; The second
article comes from the fourteenth issue of Dabiq. “The Murtadd Brotherhood”
criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood harshly and explains why do IS consider them
apostates. The article sheds the light on the Islamist State institutions from IS’s point
of view.
6.3.1. Text 8 Context:
“From Hijra to Khilafah” is an article that was published in Dabiq’s first issue.
The issue was released in Ramadan 1435 Hijri, few days after Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
speech in the Big Mosque in Mosul, Iraq. Baghdadi speech was his first speech as
Muslims Caliphate after Abu Mohamed’s al Adnani speech on the first of Ramadan in
which he announced the appointment of Baghdadi as the Caliph of Muslims and
abandoned the territorial aspect of ISIS in favor of a borderless IS.
The issue was released amidst huge disputes in the Islamist communities over
the legitimacy of IS’s Caliph. Qaeda, Nusra and several Islamist movements refused
to pledge allegiance to IS’s Caliph for several reasons. By then, IS propaganda
message was loud and clear, “Baghdadi is the Caliph, give him the Bayaa now or you
are not a genuine Muslim”. Dabiq’s first issue was designed professionally and
introduced a mixature of IS’s news, reports and religious articles that supports IS’s
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point of view and refute the others’ point of view. The issue started with introducing
Dabiq Magazine and what is the significance of the village Dabiq. It followed it with
a report “Khilafah Declared” on the announcement of the Caliphate. The following
topics were “Islamic State Reports; Imamah is from the Millah of Ibrahim; The State
in the Words of the Enemy; Feature: from Hijrah to Khilafah; Islamic State news”.
The article “From Hijra to Khilafah” was a brief article of seven pages with
much graphical content showing mainly IS’s power. An infographic was included that
introduces the five steps from Hijra to Khilafah according to IS “Hijrah, Jamaah,
Destabilize Taghut, Tamkin and Khilafah”. The article is mainly highlighting IS’s
struggle to achieve announcing the Islamist State. The article criticizes Qaeda and
other Islamist movements indirectly. The issue generally and the article particularly
introduces IS as an ideal destination for Hijra that Islamist may travel to in order to
support Islam.
6.3.2. Text 8 Analysis:
The article starts with introducing establishing the Khilafah as a goal that
occupied the hearts of the Mujahidin. The article cited Sunna to prove that the prophet
promised the reestablishment of the Khilafah. The author identified the main
difficulties that hindered the establishment of Khilafah in Afghanistan as: the
nationalism that distinguished Muslims from each other; and the innovations that
destroyed the creed (Dabiq, From Hijrah to Khilafah, 2014, p. 35). The article
clarified that Abu Musaab al Zarkawi learned from the lessons of Afghanistan that an
essential step to restore the Khilafah is through a Jamaah –Group- that is gathered
upon the Kitab and Sunnah.
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The article enumerated obligations that the Jamaah has to work on in order to
restore the monotheism. Among those obligations are: Walaa and Baraa (supporting
Muslims and deserting the infidels), Tashria (legislation) and Jihad. The author
clarified that the Jihad must be built on Hijra, Bayaa, obedience, training in order to
fight and achieve the Khilafah or Shahadah (Martyrdom). The writer followed this by
explaining the sequence. The first step to achieve the Islamist State from IS point of
view was Hijra in order to have a safe haven without the threat of a powerful police
state. The article introduced Zarqawi Hijras to Afghanistan and Kurdistan (Iraq) as
examples for Hijras that enabled the establishment of an Islamist Jamaa which is the
second step. The author mentioned creating as much chaos as possible with the means
permitted by the Sharia as the following objective. This could be implemented by
performing operations causing enemy death, injury and damage in order to destabilize
the enemies’ regimes and prevent them from being able to crush the Islamist
movements. Zarqawi used “Vechile bombs, IEDs and Istishhadiyyin –Suicidal
operation-”in order to create the required destabilization in Iraq. The article added
that, he performed dozens of operations in dozens of areas every day against the
apostates from the police forces and Rafidah. Actually, the article clarified that
Zarqawi operations were also targeting: army, intelligence, Kurds even Sunnis who
supports the “crusaders” or participate into the democratic political process. The
author asserted that the group was not involved in any attacks targeting Sunni public
places and gatherings. The objective of all of this was to keep Iraq in constant
instability and war and deprive any apostate group from a moment of security (Dabiq,
From Hijrah to Khilafah, 2014, p. 37).
After the Hijra, building the Jamaah and destabilizing the enemy, the article
introduced the Tamkin –consolidation- as the following step. This step was based on
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more complex and devastating operations that pave the way for claiming territories
leading to the gradual collapse of authority in Sunni territories. The article introduced
their state as the first state in modern times that was sat up exclusively by Mujahidin.
The Article summarized the roadmap towards Khilafah for the Mujahidin by
starting with Hijra to land with weak central authority to form the Jamaa, recruit
members and train them. This has to be followed by attacks to weaken the authority,
and follow this by stronger attacks to enable the Jihadists to control the territories to
manage the state gradually to the point of developing into a full-fledged state and
continue expansion later to new areas (Dabiq, From Hijrah to Khilafah, 2014, p. 38).
Then, the article criticized the opposition of the “present leadership of famous
Jihad groups” for becoming frozen in the attacks phase and not trying to pass it to the
Tamkin phase. The article added that this leadership considered apostates like Morsi
and Haniyeh as a hope for the Muslims. The article accused this leadership of giving
preference to popularity and rationalization over pleasing god and relying upon him,
and denying the sharia fundamentals. The article pointed out that the announcement
of the Islamic State showed the difference between genuine Islamists who are fighting
to install the Islamist State and others who are following deviant methodologies or
have corrupt desires for fame, wealth or power (Dabiq, From Hijrah to Khilafah,
2014, p. 39).
The article then focused on the importance of the unity of Muslims under the
Caliph from a religious approach. The article narrated the story of Sahawat and
criticized them harshly clarifying that they didn’t harm the Islamists as Islamists were
able to survive Sahawat attacks, and have their revenge from their leaders. The article
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was finalized by calling upon every Mulsim to raise his voice and pledge allegiance to
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Dabiq, From Hijrah to Khilafah, 2014, p. 40).
The article was a propaganda material to introduce a heroic history for the
establishment of IS and criticizing its rivals. It raises our attention to IS’s five steps
roadmap to build the Islamist State “Hijrah, Jamaa, Destabilize Taghut, Tamkin and
Khilafah”. IS believe that the Islamist State is the home that Muslims have to
immigrate to and build their Jamaa in. They believe in extreme violence to destabilize
their enemies and control territories. They criticize Qaeda approach harshly for taking
time in fighting the enemies without terrorizing them enough to install the state. IS
question the Islamist believe of other Islamist movement who doesn’t pledge
allegiance to IS’s Caliph.
6.3.3. Text 9 Context:
The article “The Murtadd Brotherhood” was issued in Dabiq’s Fourteenth
issue that was released in Rajab, 1437 Hijri, April, 2016. The issue held the same
name. The article was released almost three years after the overthrowing of Morsi
from the Egyptian presidency and amidst a dispute in the ranks of the movement
which was facing an open confrontation with the Egyptian regime. In the same time,
IS were facing the global coalition operations against IS in Iraq and Syria by
conventional and asymmetric war techniques and through lone wolves’ operations in
in Non-Islamists dominated territories.
The lack of solid organizational structure in the Brotherhood due to the
continuous security raids against their leadership in Egypt encouraged many
organizations to recruit their experienced and motivated members. Qaeda directed
many tempting soft messages to Brotherhood youth to revise their Manhaj and
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abandon the religion of democracy and return to pure Islam. Qaeda asserted that al
Banna in his last year revised his Manhaj and lost the believe in the Democracy as a
tool to install the Islamist State. IS adapted a more criticizing discourse accusing
Brotherhood founding leaders to be apostates. In this article, IS explains why do they
consider the Brotherhood apostates. They mentioned numerous reasons. Among them:
Their relations with Shiaa, Christians and Jews; following democracy and respecting
constitutions; pacifism and respect to human rights.
The feature held the same name of the issue and occupied approximately 15
pages with the minimum pictures and with no infographics. The article language was
very strong in criticizing the Brotherhood. They cited Brotherhood leader’s positions
on certain topics and compare it to IS interpretation of Sunna and Quran to prove that
the Brotherhood is not following god’s instructions. The article didn’t focus on the
Brotherhood’s post 2011 positions and gave more attention to the positions of the
founding General Guides of the Brotherhood. The article picked positions which
proves the article point of view ignoring Qutb’s positions or al-Banna’s last articles
for example.
The article didn’t criticize the Brotherhood only. It directed criticism to Qaeda and
other Islamist movements for their support and soft discourse towards the
Brotherhood. The article included an invitation to Islamists from all over the world to
migrate to the Islamist State introducing it as the only destination that Muslims can
respond to god’s call from and engage in Jihad against enemies of god.
6.3.4. Text 9 Analysis:
The article started with introducing the Brotherhood as a devastating cancer
that has emerged, mutated and spread attempting to drown the Ummah in apostasy.
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The article described the deviance of the Brotherhood to be surpassing the deviance of
the most deviant and widespread historical sects (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood,
2016, p. 28). The article was divided into sub-sections proving the Brotherhood
deviance from Islam: The Ikhwan and the Rafidah; The Ikhwan and interfaith
deviance; The Ikhwan and Legislature; The Ikhwan and Democracy; The Ikhwan and
constitutional rule; The Ikhwan and pluralism; The Ikhwan and human rights; The
Ikhwan and pacifism; The Ikhwan, patrons of the Taghut Kings of Egypt; The Ikhwan
and the Taghut Mubarak; The Ikhwan and extreme Irja; The Jihad claimants and the
Ikhwan. The article is finalized with the subsection “Baraah from The Ikhwan” which
describes the Brotherhood as a party of extreme apostasy and that Muslims have to
declare the stance of Takfir toward the group and its members.
The article accused el al-Banna of following the steps of the two “Freemason
modernists” Muhammed Abdu and Jamal al Din al Afgani in calling for wala between
the Muslims and Rafidah –Shiaa-. The article listed many trials by the Brotherhood to
neutralize the relations with Shiaa including hosting Shiaa figures and supporting
Khomeini’s revolution in Iran. The article refused the Brotherhood trial to consider
the Rafidah Muslims and to coordinate with them (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood,
2016, p. 30). The article followed this by focusing on the Brotherhood relation with
Jews and Christians. The article highlighted a statement for Hassan al Banna saying
“Our dispute with the Jews is not religious as Quran encouraged us to be friendly with
them”. In addition to this al Banna referred to Copts of Egypt as “our Christian
Brothers” and the Brotherhood released an official statement asserting that their
Christian Brothers in Egypt have the same rights and responsibilities they have. The
article concluded that the Brotherhood want to treat all Kuffar as equals with Muslims
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and reject the obligation of Jihad against Jews and Christians (Dabiq, The Murtadd
Brotherhood, 2016, p. 32).
The article tackled the Brotherhood relation with legislature, democracy and
constitutional rule in the following pages. The article confirmed that Hassan al Banna
himself ran for parliament elections twice and tried to justify participating in
parliament elections. This was followed by numerous participations for the
Brotherhood in several legislative bodies in numerous countries. IS criticized the
Brotherhood for requesting for themselves Allah’s right to legislate. The article
refuted the Brotherhood justification of running for elections in order to command the
good and forbid the evil. IS’s position was that commanding the good and forbidding
the evil has to be done by Jihad against those who go against Sharia and not by calling
Muslims to commit apostasy by choosing individuals to represent them in parliaments
as legislators beside Allah (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 33).
The article defined democracy as a religion that gives the supreme authority to
people rather than Allah (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 34). The article
criticized the Brotherhood harshly for supporting democracy in speeches for
Brotherhood’s prominent figures. Concerning the constitutions, IS considered it as
authorities of law competing with Allah Sharia. Thus, considered it tawaghit that has
to be despised, rejected and fought. IS considered it obligatory to pronounce Takfir
upon those who rule by and support constitutions. This was followed by listing
constitution articles that the Brotherhood supported which highlight equality,
freedom, citizenship and democracy (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 35).
The article followed this by refuting the concept of pluralism in the Brotherhood
literature as pluralism means that apostates may have the right to dissimilate their
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ideas and maybe take power which is against Islamism as Islamists only has the right
to rule Muslims (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 35).
The author listed many positions for the Brotherhood in which they supported
human rights which the author considered to be a part of the pagan democratic
religion. The author asserted that those rights contradicts with Islam and showed that
the Brotherhood are promoting them (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 36).
The following criticism for Ikhwan was due to their pacifism as according to the
writer, Jihad in this era is an obligation upon each and every Muslim as lands of the
Muslims have been usurped by the Kuffar and apostates. The author clarified that the
Brotherhood were not only pacifists but moreover they censured “terrorism” while
striking terror in the Kuffar is a part of Islam (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood,
2016, p. 36). The writer added that whoever censures terrorism disbelieves Islam. The
writer listed many examples for Brotherhood leaders asserting their pacifism and
censuring terrorism.
The article criticized the Brotherhood for cooperating with the Kings of Egypt
and Mubarak. The article described Kings Fuad and Farouk regimes as superficial
monarchies loyal to the British Empire ruled by secularist law and having the Kings in
its position of Khalif. The authors listed examples for the Brotherhood praising the
Egyptian monarchy (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 39). Concerning
Mubarak, the article assumed that he implemented Shirk, and inflicted oppression
upon the Muslims of Egypt. The article listed many positions for the Brotherhood
which was introduced as cooperation from the Brotherhood with Mubarak’s regime
against the Muslims (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 39).
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The following topic was the concept of Irja or the refusal of Takfir. Duat La
Qudat (Preachers Not Judges) book was introduced as form of extreme Irja that
refuses to pronounce Takfir upon the governments that ruled by manmade laws. The
article showed many examples for Brotherhood figures refusing Takfir asserting that
those who refuse Takfir of governments ruling by manmade rules are Kuffar. The
article followed this by introducing the relation between “Jihad Claimants” and the
Ikhwan describing it as the blatant deviance of the Brotherhood. The author claimed
that many Jihadist figures from most of the prominent Islamist movements –eg.
Zawahiri of Qaeda- were affected by the Brotherhood false methodology and
criticized those movements’ sympathy with the Brotherhood harshly accusing them of
sympathizing with apostates while criticizing the real Jihadists of IS (Dabiq, The
Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016, p. 41).
The article was concluded by citing IS figures criticizing the Brotherhood and
announcing that they are a party of extreme apostasy adding that it is obligatory upon
every member of the Brotherhood to abandon it and renounce its Kufri tenets. The
article also clarified that it is obligatory upon all Muslims to perform Hijrah to the
Khilafah which is the only body standing in the face of the Murtadd Brotherhood and
their Rafidah allies and Crusaders masters (Dabiq, The Murtadd Brotherhood, 2016,
p. 43).
The article was mainly directed towards Brotherhood members and
sympathizers to recruit them for IS. The article played efficiently on the
contradictions in the Brotherhood methodology –which we previously assumed to be
coming from the Brotherhood’s gradualist approach- and choose the Brotherhood’s
soft position in order to show them as an apostate non-Islamist movement. The article
showed IS position from many issues in the context of their criticism for the
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Brotherhood. Among those positions, IS positions of takfir for Shia, Christians, Jews,
Non Islamist Muslims and even Islamist movements who are not following IS
methodology of Takfir. The article also clarified IS’s position of refusing democracy
and considering it a religion and the human rights and pluralism as a part of this Kufri
religion.
6.4. Conclusion:
Although many expect that IS territorial influence will diminish, their ideas are
not expected to vanish after the military conquest. Their idealistic purist Islamist
discourse will keep inspiring future Jihadists. IS is simply perceiving their Islamist
tenets as non-negotiable. They refuse and censure the gradualist approaches and
consider it a form of apostasy. IS perceive their leader as the Muslims Caliph, and
Islamist movements and Muslims have to pledge allegiance to him. They believe in
the Kufr of those who don’t announce Takfir over governments who are not applying
Sharia.
IS believe that installing the Caliphate is an obligation that Muslims must fulfill.
As soon as Ahl al Hal we al Akd pledge allegiance to a Caliph, Muslims from all over
the world have to pledge allegiance to him and the legitimacy of every Islamist
movement who didn’t give the Bayaa to him falls. IS don’t see the agreement of the
Islamist movements on the Caliph a condition to appoint him. Moreover, they believe
that Islamist movements won’t ever agree on a single nominee. Yet, IS believe in
waging war against those who don’t recognize the appointed Caliph.
Applying Sharia is a nonnegotiable issue for IS. IS don’t just declare the apostasy
of governments who are not applying Sharia. They declare the apostasy of those who
doesn’t declare the apostasy of governments who are not applying the Shariia. IS texts
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were considering applying the Sharia as a nonnegotiable obligation whether people
agreed with it or not. They criticized the Brotherhood for calling the people to vote for
candidates who request Allah’s right to legislate. IS is believing that Sharia is the only
source of legislation. IS doesn’t recognize international borders and citizenship.
IS consider democracy a pagan religion whose followers are definitely not
Muslims. IS give the Caliph the full power upon the Bayaa of Ahl al Hal wa al Akd
and believe that the state has to act to fulfill god orders and not to pacify its citizens.
Moreover, they believe that violence and terrorism are the only way to install the
Sharia and the Caliphate. IS developed the five steps model to install the Caliphate
which depends mainly on force.
IS is definitely the most radical movement of the three studied movements as it
doesn’t tolerate any gradual or maneuvering techniques. IS is not only refusing to ally
with non-Muslim movements. They are not ready to ally with Islamist movement who
doesn’t share their methodology and consider many prominent Islamist movement
apostates.

Summary:
IS
Caliphate

Installed upon the agreement of Ahl al Hal we al Akd even
if the Islamist movements disagree on the nominee

Sharia

The only source of legislation and has to be applied
promptly. Those who don’t announce Takfir of
governments that don’t apply Sharia are Kuffar
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Democratic

Democracy is a pagan religion and the ruler must be chosen

institutions

by Ahl al Hal we al Akd and he has full powers

Power usage to install

Power must be used to install Sharia and Caliphate. IS

Sharia

model to install Caliphate comprises (Hijra-JamaaDestabilizing Taghut-Tamkin-Caliphate)
Table 6.1

7. Conclusion
Few days before the release of this thesis, Abd Rabou issued an article that
raised the question “did Islamic Sharia imply a political regime that we can
consider “The Islamist Political Regime””. Abd Rabou asserted that there were no
common characteristics for what was called the Islamic regime in the previous
thirteen centuries except that those who ruled were Muslims (Abd Rabou, 2017).
The findings of this thesis are not discrepant. The three studied Islamist
movements don’t agree on a common understanding for the institutions of the
Islamist State. They share the willingness to install an Islamist Caliphate. Yet,
they disagree on the conditions of announcing the Caliphate; The gradualism in
applying Sharia; Their position from democracy; and their willingness to use
power to enforce Sharia. These disagreements maybe explained either by the
conditions of the foundation of the movement and its main objectives or by
deficiencies in creating the knowledge base on the Islamic political regimes.
The three movements are willing eventually to install the Islamic Caliphate
and consider it a religious obligation. They also agree that the Islamic Sharia has
to be applied in Muslims territories. Yet, they disagree on the urgency of installing
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the Caliphate and applying the Sharia. IS perceives this obligation as an urgent
obligation that must be installed even if there was a disagreement among Islamist
movements on the nominee for Caliph. They see that Sharia must be applied
promptly whether citizens choose to apply it or not as it is the god will that must
be applied. Qaeda also believes in the need for installing a Caliph. Yet, they
tolerate installing territorial Emirs as a step towards installing the Caliph if uniting
the Muslims behind one Caliph is impossible. The priority for Qaeda is fighting
the far enemy who Qaeda perceive as the source of all evil. Qaeda believes in the
supremacy of Sharia too, and not accept mixing the divine laws with manmade
laws. The Brotherhood were clear about the objective of installing the Caliph in
Banna and Qutb texts. Yet, when they drafted the electoral program of Mursi in
the Egyptian elections, they focused on the concept of the national state. Banna
believed in installing the Caliphate through pacts, alliances and diplomatic tools in
a gradual way. The Brotherhood under Mursi believed that applying his electoral
program is a first step in a long path to achieve Sharia. Banna also believed in
democracy as a tool to apply Sharia. Qutb believed that Sharia is a part of believe
in the monotheism and has to be applied away from any considerations. The three
movements believe in installing the Caliphate and applying the Sharia. Yet, the
disagree on the strategy to achieve this end.
The three movements position from Democracy vary significantly.

IS

consider Democracy a pagan religion which contradicts with Islam. They show no
sign for tolerating public will and refuse pacifying the public. Qaeda also refused
democracy. Yet, Zawahiri discourse indicated a tolerance to react to the public
will as long as it is not contradicting with Sharia. Mursi electoral program showed
complete embracement for the modern democratic model. Banna showed
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acceptance for the constitutional democracy too. Yet, he refused the multi-party
system. Qutb refused the concept of having the people as a source of legislation
and considered this a form of polytheism.
The reason behind the embracement of every movement for a different
strategy in installing the Islamist State requires an intensive study and can be a
subject for future research. Yet, the available literature shed the light on eye
catching differences in the political conditions around each movement that may
had a determining effect on the movement strategy. The Brotherhood was
established in a relatively constitutional regime that tolerated political activism,
and civil society. They reached the peak of embracing the democratic model prior
to the free presidential elections of 2012. This may explain the Brotherhood
gradualist approach by their ability to pursue the change by democratic means.
The Brotherhood is an Islamist movement that accepted democracy as democracy
was a valid strategy to achieve the Islamist State in the movement’s political
context.
Qaeda’s primary objective was defeating the far enemy who occupy the
Muslim holy lands and support the oppressive regimes in Muslim lands. Qaeda’s
priority was fostering alliances that enables them to fight the far enemy to force it
to withdraw and deter it from further interference in Muslim lands. The previous
made Qaeda tend to postpone the tensions over sensitive issue like Caliphate in
order to keep the Islamist line united against the far enemy who is the biggest
obstacle –from their point of view- against the establishment of the Caliphate.
IS was born in a battlefield where they were fighting the Iraqi regime, Shiaa
militias and Sunni Sahwat. Showing power was important to deter the enemy.
Showing a relative advantage over other Islamist movement was essential to
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attract recruits. Installing the Caliphate gave IS an advantage over the other
Islamist movements and made its lands in Syria and Iraq a favorable destination
for Hijra for Islamists from all over the globe.
The deficiency of the knowledge base on the Islamic political regimes was
clear in the movements’ texts. The six issues that were mentioned in the
theoretical framework affected the movements’ visions for the Islamist State
severely. The Islamist movements used historical events as religious references in
many occasions ignoring the fact that those historical events doesn’t imply
religious significance as explained by Aref (al Khateeb, 2005) and proved in
several texts in this thesis. The Islamic literature tolerated various versions of the
Islamic state. Yet, the Islamist movements are not tolerating any version but what
they believe in. The exaggerated interest in reaching political power to install the
state was apparent and caused an Islamist-Islamist disputes that caused warfare in
many occasions.
In conclusions, The Muslims Brotherhood, Qaeda and IS are looking forward
to install the Islamist State. They agree that the Islamist State has to be a Caliphate
uniting Muslims all over the globe and has to be ruled by Sharia. Yet, the three
movements disagree on the strategy of installing the state and the degree of
tolerance for Democracy inside this state. The reason behind the disagreements of
the movements requires further research and study. Yet, the available literature
gives significant importance to the circumstances of foundation and the priorities
of each movement which was interpreted in their strategy to install the Islamic
State in addition to a deficiency in the knowledge base on Islamic political
regimes.
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The Brotherhood

Qaeda

IS

Primary objective of

Primary objective.

Primary objective.

Muslims. Has to be

Tolerate territorial

Prompt obligation for

applied gradually

Emirs if there is no

Muslims even if they

through Diplomacy

agreement over one

disagree on the Caliph

According to Banna
Caliphate

Caliph.
Sharia

Component of Islam

The only source of

The only source of

mentioned in Quran

legislation that can’t be

legislation and has to be

and Sunna

mixed with other

applied promptly. Those

sources

who don’t announce
Takfir of governments
that don’t apply Sharia
are Kuffar

Democratic

Refused political

Refused democracy and

Refused democracy and

institutions

parties. Yet, accepted

considered it a religion.

considered it a religion.

parliament and

Tolerated public will in

constitution

some issues not
contradicting with
Sharia

Power usage

Accepted, If there is no

Defeating the far enemy

Accepted, and perceive it

to install

other mean

is the priority

as obligation

Strategy to

Democracy followed

Defeating the far enemy

Forcing their influence

install the

by diplomacy

followed by its agents

by power

Sharia
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Caliphate
Reason

Being founded in a

A reaction to the

Being founded in an

behind the

relatively democratic

occupation of the

open confrontation with

strategy

and free political

Muslims holy lands

several factions and the

environment

need for relative
advantage

Table 7.1
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